arXiv:2609. 29958v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study a matching mechanism where agents and objects are described by features rather than complete rankings.
arXiv:2506. 03802v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce a learning problem in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents select actions to interact with their match.
arXiv:2607. 04824v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study a sequential learning problem for stable matchings in two-sided markets where preferences on both sides are initially unknown.
arXiv:2606. 29221v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We address the problem of online multi-human multi-robot teaming through the lens of a linear matching bandit framework, where a learner assigns robots with unknown features from a fixed pool to distinct sets of human agents over multiple rounds.
The paper investigates welfare‑maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when agents use costly effort for screening instead of monetary transfers. It shows that as the number of object types increases, no‑screening mechanisms become more efficient, reducing the need for screening. The authors prove that in a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. log‑concave values, the multidimensional allocation problem collapses to a single‑dimensional one based on agents’ best‑option values, and they demonstrate that this no‑screening optimality persists even as variety expands, supported by large‑variety limits and numerical experiments. The findings are applied to design an invitation‑based vaccine appointment system.
The paper introduces a new online fair division framework where a learner must allocate indivisible items to agents in real time, balancing fairness and efficiency. Traditional methods rely on many copies of each item to estimate utilities, but this is unrealistic for platforms with many users and few interactions. By treating utility as an unknown function of item-agent features and framing the problem as a contextual bandit, the authors propose algorithms that achieve sublinear regret and demonstrate their effectiveness experimentally.
The paper introduces “SNSW-Alg”, an algorithm that finds a stable matching maximizing Nash social welfare in the stable marriage problem. It runs in ×O(n^4) time and balances equity while maintaining stability. Experiments across various preference distributions show significant fairness gains with minimal impact on regret, egalitarian criterion, and sex equality, and the resulting matchings are statistically Pareto-undominated by other fairness-based stable matchings.
The paper introduces a dynamic bipartite matching framework that uses large language model (LLM) agents and contextual bandits to model decentralized, asynchronous matching processes without requiring full preference rankings. In a simulated Chinese marriage market, LLM agents evaluate local candidates while Logistic-UCB models learn reciprocal acceptance, leading to higher mutual welfare and fewer blocking pairs compared to classical Gale–Shapley. The study validates LLM-generated preferences against empirical data and demonstrates gender-differentiated acceptance patterns, supporting the use of decentralized LLM-based matching for economic simulation and computational social science.
arXiv:2511. 11413v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Consider the problem of finding the best matching in a weighted graph where we only have access to predictions of the actual stochastic weights, based on an underlying context.
The paper extends the concept of social laws from deterministic, goal-based multi‑agent systems to stochastic, reward‑based environments. It introduces a formalism for defining and verifying the robustness of these laws, including a new metric called α‑robustness that quantifies the utility each agent can guarantee while following the law. The authors present a verification approach that reduces the problem to solving multiple Markov decision processes and demonstrate the framework’s potential through empirical evaluations on toy environments.
arXiv:2609. 03846v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical additive valuations, focusing on envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Nash social welfare (NSW).
The paper introduces Agentic Share-of-Search (ASoS), a multi‑agent AI system designed to aid sellers in competitive decision‑making within large‑language‑model (LLM) mediated e‑commerce. It automates competitive visibility measurement and root‑cause diagnosis by deploying query agents on leading AI platforms and employing a ReAct‑based diagnostic agent to suggest prioritized merchandising actions. A 100‑trial ablation study demonstrates the prototype’s effectiveness, recovering the ablated signal in 39% of trials (95% CI: 30.0%‑48.8%) and 63.9% in high‑correlation cases, outperforming chance by 5.5×.
arXiv:2606. 06744v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Two-sided matching markets often involve information that unfolds over time through interviews, repeated interaction, learning, and separation.