The paper introduces a dynamic bipartite matching framework that uses large language model (LLM) agents and contextual bandits to model decentralized, asynchronous matching processes without requiring full preference rankings. In a simulated Chinese marriage market, LLM agents evaluate local candidates while Logistic-UCB models learn reciprocal acceptance, leading to higher mutual welfare and fewer blocking pairs compared to classical Gale–Shapley. The study validates LLM-generated preferences against empirical data and demonstrates gender-differentiated acceptance patterns, supporting the use of decentralized LLM-based matching for economic simulation and computational social science.
arXiv:2606. 06744v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Two-sided matching markets often involve information that unfolds over time through interviews, repeated interaction, learning, and separation.
arXiv:2506. 03802v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce a learning problem in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents select actions to interact with their match.
arXiv:2605. 01961v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Learning from human preference data is becoming a useful tool, from fine-tuning large language models to training reinforcement learning agents.
arXiv:2511. 04500v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as decision-making agents in high-stakes domains and as imitators of human behavior in the social and behavioral sciences.
arXiv:2509. 23102v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the standard paradigm for aligning large language models with human preferences.
arXiv:2608. 12125v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLM-based agents with user-instructed goals are becoming widely deployed, they increasingly encounter each other in strategic interactions, and face challenges of finding mutually beneficial outcomes.
Personalizing marketing messages with contextual multi-armed bandits (CMABs) drives real business value, yet the objective that ultimately matters - a downstream conversion - is observed only weeks later, too late to drive online learning. Teams therefore train the bandit on a fast proxy reward, and separately must judge whether a contextual bandit is worth its complexity over sending one best message.
arXiv:2512. 04988v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Emerging agentic marketplaces provide the economic infrastructure for matching and coordinating the large amounts of AI agents used in agentic swarms.
arXiv:2606. 19883v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in the competitive setup with two-sided matching markets under a human centric decision making model.
The study examines how users of a major dating platform respond to autonomous LLM agents that converse on their behalf. Using two large surveys, researchers built a latent-variable model showing that willingness to send and receive agent-mediated messages are highly correlated yet distinct. The findings reveal a delegation asymmetry: users are more willing to deploy their own agent than to engage with others’ agents, leading to low overall reciprocity and gender‑directional imbalances in agent interactions.
arXiv:2608. 11560v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Personalizing marketing messages with contextual multi-armed bandits (CMABs) drives real business value, yet the objective that ultimately matters - a downstream conversion - is observed only weeks later, too late to drive online learning.
The paper introduces “SNSW-Alg”, an algorithm that finds a stable matching maximizing Nash social welfare in the stable marriage problem. It runs in ×O(n^4) time and balances equity while maintaining stability. Experiments across various preference distributions show significant fairness gains with minimal impact on regret, egalitarian criterion, and sex equality, and the resulting matchings are statistically Pareto-undominated by other fairness-based stable matchings.