arXiv:2607. 04824v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study a sequential learning problem for stable matchings in two-sided markets where preferences on both sides are initially unknown.
Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.
arXiv:2506. 03802v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce a learning problem in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents select actions to interact with their match.
arXiv:2606. 06744v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Two-sided matching markets often involve information that unfolds over time through interviews, repeated interaction, learning, and separation.
arXiv:2606. 19883v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in the competitive setup with two-sided matching markets under a human centric decision making model.
arXiv:2606. 19328v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Preference-based RL provides an approach to learning reward models from pairwise comparisons of behaviors, bypassing the need for explicit reward design.
arXiv:2609.19963v2 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Exploration in centralized serial-dictatorship matching bandits must use complete matchings, so learning one player-arm pair can impose regret on oth...
arXiv:2607. 08979v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study the active learning problem of fixed-confidence top-$k$ identification from noisy pairwise comparisons.