From Preference to Reciprocity: Decentralized Matching with Empirically Grounded LLM-agent Based Modeling

The paper introduces a dynamic bipartite matching framework that uses large language model (LLM) agents and contextual bandits to model decentralized, asynchronous matching processes without requiring full preference rankings. In a simulated Chinese marriage market, LLM agents evaluate local candidates while Logistic-UCB models learn reciprocal acceptance, leading to higher mutual welfare and fewer blocking pairs compared to classical Gale–Shapley. The study validates LLM-generated preferences against empirical data and demonstrates gender-differentiated acceptance patterns, supporting the use of decentralized LLM-based matching for economic simulation and computational social science.

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• llms
• agents
• reinforcement-learning