arXiv:2506. 03802v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce a learning problem in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents select actions to interact with their match.
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arXiv:2606. 19883v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in the competitive setup with two-sided matching markets under a human centric decision making model.
arXiv:2607. 04824v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study a sequential learning problem for stable matchings in two-sided markets where preferences on both sides are initially unknown.
arXiv:2606. 06744v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Two-sided matching markets often involve information that unfolds over time through interviews, repeated interaction, learning, and separation.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2607. 05813v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study repeated contextual procurement auctions in which the platform must learn context-dependent product values from bandit feedback.
arXiv:2609.22757v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A (coarse) correlated equilibrium (CE) is information-value-free (IVF) if a player can match the payoff obtained from recommendations by committing t...