arXiv:2506. 03802v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce a learning problem in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents select actions to interact with their match.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.
arXiv:2606. 19883v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in the competitive setup with two-sided matching markets under a human centric decision making model.
arXiv:2607. 04824v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study a sequential learning problem for stable matchings in two-sided markets where preferences on both sides are initially unknown.
arXiv:2606. 06744v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Two-sided matching markets often involve information that unfolds over time through interviews, repeated interaction, learning, and separation.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2607. 05813v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study repeated contextual procurement auctions in which the platform must learn context-dependent product values from bandit feedback.
arXiv:2608. 10526v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Motivated by decentralized applications, we study cooperative multi-agent bandits in continuous (Lipschitz) action spaces when the Lipschitz constant is unknown.