arXiv:2510. 10813v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to domains that require reasoning about other agents' behavior, such as negotiation, policy design, and market simulation.
By Enric Junque de Fortuny, Veronica Roberta Cappelli
The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) struggle in strategic decision-making under incomplete information. It identifies two key gaps: an observation‑belief gap where LLMs’ internal representations of game states are accurate but brittle, and a belief‑action gap where converting these internal beliefs into actions is weak, leading to suboptimal payoffs. Experiments with Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt‑oss confirm that acting optimally on decoded beliefs would improve outcomes in most games, highlighting a bottleneck in belief‑to‑action conversion.
By Jan Sobotka, Mustafa O. Karabag, Ufuk Topcu
arXiv:2607. 01661v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent systems are increasingly used for forecasting future events, as deliberation among multiple LLMs is believed to improve reasoning and calibration.
By Yuante Li, Yicheng Tao, Kate Zhang, Taozhi Wang, Gefei Gu, Yaxin Zhou
Multi-agent systems are increasingly used for forecasting future events, as deliberation among multiple LLMs is believed to improve reasoning and calibration. Yet existing approaches overlook a critical design choice: what information each agent receives.
The study evaluates mentalization—the capacity to infer others’ beliefs and intentions—in large language models (LLMs) using two economic games and cognitive computational modeling. Researchers tested 2,099 LLM agents from four model families (DeepSeek, GPT‑4.1, GPT‑5, Gemini 2.0 Flash) against opponents of varying sophistication, comparing their performance to 251 human participants. Results show that LLMs exhibit distinct mentalizing behaviors that vary by model provider and size, with strategic prompting generally enhancing performance; notably, GPT‑5 agents adapt their recursive reasoning depth to match opponent sophistication, outperforming humans in one task.
By Aamir Sohail, Xintong Zhong, Arkady Konovalov, Patricia L. Lockwood, Lei Zhang
arXiv:2608. 09638v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Theory of Mind (ToM) is essential for agent interactions, yet existing evaluations either rely on static scenarios that oversimplify mental-state reasoning or interactive settings that provide limited diagnostic insight.
By Yen-Shan Chen, Yu Chian Duan, Chih-En Kuo, Jian-Bin Wu, Yun-Nung Chen
arXiv:2607. 02686v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement learning agents operating under partial observability must act on incomplete information, making them natural candidates for guidance from small language models (SLMs) that carry broad reasoning priors.
By Juarez Monteiro, Nathan Gavenski, Guilherme Lima, Francisco Galuppo, Odinaldo Rodrigues, Adriano Veloso
arXiv:2606. 17657v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: People make decisions differently in strategic interactions.
By Zirui Cheng, Zeyu Shen, Thomas L. Griffiths, Peter Henderson
arXiv:2608. 06128v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Search agents extend large language models beyond static parametric memory by enabling them to acquire and use ex ternal evidence during multi-step reasoning.
By Xingyu Guo, Wei Chen, Linlin Yang, Baochang Zhang
arXiv:2509. 26306v5 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Existing multi-agent learning approaches have developed interactive training environments to explicitly promote collaboration among multiple Large Language Models (LLMs), thereby constructing stronger multi-agent systems (MAS).
By Hehai Lin, Shilei Cao, Sudong Wang, Haotian Wu, Minzhi Li, Linyi Yang, Juepeng Zheng, Chengwei Qin
The paper introduces online contextual matrix games, a framework that merges contextual bandits with multi‑player online games to handle dynamic contexts and strategic interactions. It presents OnGameLearn, an algorithm that balances exploration and exploitation across actions and contexts, providing statistical guarantees such as tail bounds, Nash equilibrium convergence, asymptotic normality, and sublinear regret. The authors also define a policy value for matrix games and propose a doubly robust, √T‑consistent estimator, demonstrating effectiveness through simulations and a hotel pricing case study.
By Liner Xiang, Yixin Wang, Hengrui Cai
arXiv:2606. 08068v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems often fail to reliably outperform a single strong model equipped with best-of-N sampling.
By Yi Xie, Zhanke Zhou, Chentao Cao, Bo Liu, Bo Han