arXiv AI

Avalon-ToM-Bench: Evaluating Fine-Grained Theory of Mind via Asymmetric Game Mechanics

arXiv:2608. 09638v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Theory of Mind (ToM) is essential for agent interactions, yet existing evaluations either rely on static scenarios that oversimplify mental-state reasoning or interactive settings that provide limited diagnostic insight.

arXiv AI
Aug 28

Assessing mentalization in humans and large language models

The study evaluates mentalization—the capacity to infer others’ beliefs and intentions—in large language models (LLMs) using two economic games and cognitive computational modeling. Researchers tested 2,099 LLM agents from four model families (DeepSeek, GPT‑4.1, GPT‑5, Gemini 2.0 Flash) against opponents of varying sophistication, comparing their performance to 251 human participants. Results show that LLMs exhibit distinct mentalizing behaviors that vary by model provider and size, with strategic prompting generally enhancing performance; notably, GPT‑5 agents adapt their recursive reasoning depth to match opponent sophistication, outperforming humans in one task.

By Aamir Sohail, Xintong Zhong, Arkady Konovalov, Patricia L. Lockwood, Lei Zhang
arXiv AI
Jul 14

Beyond Sally-Anne: Evaluating Theory of Mind in LLMs using Epistemic Schelling Points

arXiv:2607. 11363v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Text-based evaluations of Theory of Mind (ToM) in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involve cognitive tests akin to the Sally-Anne task that can be gamed due to exposure to relevantly similar tasks in pre-training and do not obviously test models' functional ToM abilities in ways that generalize to naturalistic settings.

By Roberta Rocca, Sami Boukortt, Geoff Keeling, Winnie Street
arXiv AI
Aug 17

The Metacognitive Bottleneck: Japanese Riddles Reveal Fundamental Limits of Machine Insight and Self-Evaluation in Reasoning AI

arXiv:2509. 14704v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Benchmark saturation and training-data contamination increasingly obscure whether reported gains in large language models (LLMs) reflect genuine advances in reasoning or familiarity with recurring patterns in benchmark problems.

By Masaharu Mizumoto, Dat Nguyen, Zhiheng Han, Xingfu Li, Yo Nakawake, Le Minh Nguyen
arXiv AI
Sep 2

HugAgent: A Human Simulation Benchmark for Individual-Level Reasoning

arXiv:2510.15144v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Simulating human reasoning in open-ended tasks has long been a central aspiration in AI and cognitive science. While large language models now appr...

By Chance Jiajie Li, Zhenze Mo, Yuhan Tang, Ao Qu, Jiayi Wu, Kaiya Ivy Zhao, Yulu Gan, Jie Fan, Jiangbo Yu, Hang Jiang, Paul Pu Liang, Jinhua Zhao, Luis Alberto Alonso Pastor, Kent Larson
arXiv AI
Jul 14

People use fast and flat simulation to reason about new games

arXiv:2510. 11503v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Games have long been a microcosm for studying planning and reasoning in both natural and artificial intelligence (AI), often focusing on expert-level or even super-human play.

By Katherine M. Collins, Cedegao E. Zhang, Lionel Wong, Mauricio Barba da Costa, Graham Todd, Adrian Weller, Samuel J. Cheyette, Thomas L. Griffiths, Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jun 30

Theory of Mind and Persuasion Beyond Conversation: Assessing the Capacity of LLMs to Induce Belief States via Planning and Action

Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks for Large Language Models (LLMs) typically rely on passive question-answering formats, but the deployment of LLMs in increasingly agentic and autonomous forms demands new evaluations. In this paper we evaluate an agent's ability to induce specific belief states in other agents by taking actions rather than using conversational persuasion, a capability we call Non-Conversational Planning ToM (NCP-ToM).