arXiv:2608. 14613v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern LLM-agent frameworks increasingly interoperate through standards such as Anthropic's Model Context Protocol (MCP) for agent-to-tool access and Google's Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol for agent delegation and negotiation.
By Wael Albayaydh, Rui Zhao
arXiv:2605. 13909v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation.
By Erica Zhang, Fangzhao Zhang, Aneesh Pappu, Batu El, Jose Blanchet, Susan Athey, Jiashuo Liu, James Zou
The paper investigates whether large language models can extend their agentic capabilities to goal pursuit in open-ended multi-turn dialogue. It introduces Tool-Mediated Interaction (TMI), a training-free protocol that frames dialogue actions as tool calls and responses as tool results, preserving a continuous reasoning–action–observation loop. Across social interaction, emotional support, persuasion, and price negotiation tasks, TMI improves goal attainment, preference, donation amounts, and negotiation margins while reducing reasoning tokens and cross-turn phrase reuse.
By Mingyu Chen, Jingkai Lin, Xiaofen Xing, Liankai Huang, Ruiqi Xiong, Xiangmin Xu
The study examines how Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning and prosocial beliefs influence large language models (LLMs) in the ultimatum game. By initializing LLM agents with Greedy, Fair, or Selfless beliefs and applying chain‑of‑thought or varying levels of ToM reasoning, the authors ran 2,700 simulations across several models, including o3‑mini and DeepSeek‑R1 Distilled Qwen 32B. Results show that ToM‑enhanced LLMs align more closely with human decision patterns, exhibit greater consistency, and achieve better negotiation outcomes, with Llama 3.3 70B producing the most belief‑consistent reasoning.
whyItMatters":"The findings clarify the importance of incorporating Theory of Mind into LLMs to improve their alignment with human norms in cooperative decision‑making tasks."
By Neemesh Yadav, Yihuai Lan, Shan Dong, Mai Hieu Hien, Palakorn Achananuparp, Jing Jiang, Ee-Peng Lim
The paper introduces the Preference-Behavior Model (PBM), which jointly infers Large Language Model (LLM) preferences and imperfect decision-making mechanisms from observed choices. By applying PBM to three social dilemma games—Public Goods, Collective-Risk, and Common-Pool Resource—the authors show that preferences derived from one dilemma can predict behavior in others, whereas traditional behavioral economic elicitation instruments fail to do so consistently. The study also evaluates how well inferred preferences align with persona instructions, revealing both broad agreement and specific divergences across dimensions, LLMs, and games.
By Axel Abels, Elias Fern\'andez Domingos, Tom Lenaerts
arXiv:2607. 05863v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations.
By Shuze Daniel Liu, Claire Chen, Jiabao Sean Xiao, Xin Chen, David Simchi-Levi
arXiv:2607. 09600v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language model (LLM) agents requires effective orchestration of diverse expert models and tools.
By Kaiji Zhou, Ales Leonardis, Yue Feng
The study evaluates mentalization—the capacity to infer others’ beliefs and intentions—in large language models (LLMs) using two economic games and cognitive computational modeling. Researchers tested 2,099 LLM agents from four model families (DeepSeek, GPT‑4.1, GPT‑5, Gemini 2.0 Flash) against opponents of varying sophistication, comparing their performance to 251 human participants. Results show that LLMs exhibit distinct mentalizing behaviors that vary by model provider and size, with strategic prompting generally enhancing performance; notably, GPT‑5 agents adapt their recursive reasoning depth to match opponent sophistication, outperforming humans in one task.
By Aamir Sohail, Xintong Zhong, Arkady Konovalov, Patricia L. Lockwood, Lei Zhang
The paper presents an agent designed for the GLEE Competition that engages in bargaining, negotiation, and persuasion games against human and AI opponents. The agent combines a classical game‑theoretic solver, an online Bayesian layer for estimating opponent archetypes, and a language model for generating messages. Experiments include 13,200 Monte Carlo games against 11 synthetic archetypes, an ablation study of the opponent‑modeling layer, and an analysis of 9,337 live‑game messages showing a strong correlation between moral rhetoric framing and buyer purchase decisions.
By Hayden Arnold
arXiv:2510. 10813v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to domains that require reasoning about other agents' behavior, such as negotiation, policy design, and market simulation.
By Enric Junque de Fortuny, Veronica Roberta Cappelli
The study investigates how large language models (LLMs) perform in a double auction market, a common economic mechanism. By replacing human participants with LLM agents, the authors find that markets with LLMs converge more slowly or not at all, leading to less efficient resource allocations. Analysis of trading decisions reveals significant variation across model families and roles, and a lexical study of Chain-of-Thought traces links trade execution to a shift from strategic thinking to urgency.
By Pawel Struski, Jakub Swistak, Inez Okulska, Przemyslaw Biecek
The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) struggle in strategic decision-making under incomplete information. It identifies two key gaps: an observation‑belief gap where LLMs’ internal representations of game states are accurate but brittle, and a belief‑action gap where converting these internal beliefs into actions is weak, leading to suboptimal payoffs. Experiments with Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt‑oss confirm that acting optimally on decoded beliefs would improve outcomes in most games, highlighting a bottleneck in belief‑to‑action conversion.
By Jan Sobotka, Mustafa O. Karabag, Ufuk Topcu