arXiv:2608. 06741v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reasoning in large language models (LLMs) is often grounded in human text, human demonstrations, and human-generated rationales.
By Han Wang, Philippe Beardsell, Boning Li, Aaron Sasmita, Shuai Li, Hongyuan Zha, Baoxiang Wang
arXiv:2601. 19082v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that negotiate, coordinate, and act on behalf of users.
By Trung-Kiet Huynh, Dao-Sy Duy-Minh, Thanh-Bang Cao, Phong-Hao Le, Hong-Dan Nguyen, Phu-Quy Nguyen-Lam, Minh-Luan Nguyen-Vo, Hong-Phat Pham, Phu-Hoa Pham, Thien-Kim Than, Chi-Nguyen Tran, Huy Tran, Gia-Thoai Tran-Le, Alessio Buscemi, Le Hong Trang, The Anh Han
arXiv:2607. 27536v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Learning a strategic task changes more than what is directly taught: fine-tuning on one game can either enhance or degrade an agent's ability to reason in another.
By Joshua Caiata, Sreepriya Pulyassary, Xiang Li, Kate Larson
arXiv:2606. 07552v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models exhibit innate behavioral tendencies when deployed as strategic agents -- notably a risk-averse "turtle" bias toward defensive play.
By Augustin Chan
arXiv:2606. 17657v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: People make decisions differently in strategic interactions.
By Zirui Cheng, Zeyu Shen, Thomas L. Griffiths, Peter Henderson
arXiv:2608. 12626v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Strategic reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs) within long-horizon environments is often limited by inconsistent subgoals.
By Yi Wu, Zhimin Hu