arXiv:2510. 10813v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to domains that require reasoning about other agents' behavior, such as negotiation, policy design, and market simulation.
By Enric Junque de Fortuny, Veronica Roberta Cappelli
The paper investigates whether large language models (LLMs) correctly gauge their confidence when acting in a hidden‑information chess variant. In experiments where the location of a hidden royal piece is repeatedly relocated, the models’ stated probabilities about the piece’s position were almost never accurate at high confidence levels, with a calibration deficit concentrated in those high‑confidence events. Across multiple model configurations and providers, the same pattern emerged, and conventional evaluation metrics such as legality, cost, latency, and completion rate were found to be uncorrelated with belief quality, yet a model could still win the game despite poor confidence estimates.
By Bhushan Kashinath Joshi
Agentic systems increasingly gate actions on a model's own stated confidence, which assumes confidence tracks correctness at the moment of acting. We test this in a hidden-information chess variant wh...
The paper presents an agent designed for the GLEE Competition that engages in bargaining, negotiation, and persuasion games against human and AI opponents. The agent combines a classical game‑theoretic solver, an online Bayesian layer for estimating opponent archetypes, and a language model for generating messages. Experiments include 13,200 Monte Carlo games against 11 synthetic archetypes, an ablation study of the opponent‑modeling layer, and an analysis of 9,337 live‑game messages showing a strong correlation between moral rhetoric framing and buyer purchase decisions.
By Hayden Arnold
arXiv:2606. 07552v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models exhibit innate behavioral tendencies when deployed as strategic agents -- notably a risk-averse "turtle" bias toward defensive play.
By Augustin Chan
The study examines how Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning and prosocial beliefs influence large language models (LLMs) in the ultimatum game. By initializing LLM agents with Greedy, Fair, or Selfless beliefs and applying chain‑of‑thought or varying levels of ToM reasoning, the authors ran 2,700 simulations across several models, including o3‑mini and DeepSeek‑R1 Distilled Qwen 32B. Results show that ToM‑enhanced LLMs align more closely with human decision patterns, exhibit greater consistency, and achieve better negotiation outcomes, with Llama 3.3 70B producing the most belief‑consistent reasoning.
whyItMatters":"The findings clarify the importance of incorporating Theory of Mind into LLMs to improve their alignment with human norms in cooperative decision‑making tasks."
By Neemesh Yadav, Yihuai Lan, Shan Dong, Mai Hieu Hien, Palakorn Achananuparp, Jing Jiang, Ee-Peng Lim
arXiv:2610.18354v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Game-theoretic benchmarks claim that large language model (LLM) strategic decision-making varies across game types, interaction structures, and capabil...
By Arastun Mammadli, Herbert Woisetschl\"ager, Jawad Fayaz, Shiqiang Wang
arXiv:2606. 24391v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce Age of LLM, a turn-based 1v1 benchmark in which two LLMs face off on a 13x7 grid to destroy the enemy base.
By Arnaud Ricci
GENSTRAT is a system that evaluates strategic reasoning in large language models (LLMs) by procedurally generating two-player zero-sum imperfect-information betting games on demand. Each game is scored across five complexity axes—state space, temporal contingency, opponent dependence, private information, and precision—and assessed via Monte Carlo simulation. Using this generator, the authors created a 50-game benchmark, ran a tournament of twelve frontier and open-weight models with over 40,000 LLM vs. LLM matches, and found that the performance gap on the hardest games is 1.7 times larger than across all games, with higher thinking budgets, opponent strategy disclosure, and tailored reasoning improving outcomes.
By Vartan Shadarevian, Kia Ghods, Alex Kenich, Anany Kotawala
The paper investigates whether in-context learning (ICL) in large language model agents reflects genuine recursive reasoning or simply statistical extrapolation. By testing LLM agents in a public goods game with manipulated historical feedback, the authors compare decision quality to a rational expectations equilibrium benchmark. They find that disrupting historical patterns eliminates the benefits of longer context, especially in highly interdependent settings, indicating that ICL behavior aligns more with statistical extrapolation than strategic reasoning.
By Yu Liu, Wenwen Li, Yifan Dou, Guangnan Ye
arXiv:2610.17310v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Language-model agents are expected to adapt to others whose behavior changes through interaction. Yet adaptation may rely on learned behavioral pattern...
By Hanbo Xie, Yue Zhao, Robert C. Wilson
arXiv:2606. 27909v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Theory-of-mind evaluations of large language models typically use dyadic social-deduction games, where every observable cue points to a single hidden side, so a model with strong language priors can score well without ever simulating opponents' incentives.
By Avni Mittal