arXiv:2606. 26139v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper develops a multiscale model of coalition formation in which strategic exit-and-join decisions are coupled with tactical consensus dynamics inside coalitions.
By Quanyan Zhu
arXiv:2606. 28824v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper develops a continuum theory of exit-and-join coalition dynamics in nonatomic cooperative games.
By Quanyan Zhu
arXiv:2607. 26788v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Clustered federated learning benefits from organizing heterogeneous participants into coalitions that train coalition-specific models, but such clustering is sustainable only if participants prefer their assigned coalition and the required transfers are affordable.
By Cengis Hasan
arXiv:2510. 14907v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability.
By Geelon So, Yi-An Ma
arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).
By Omar Abbadi, Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos
arXiv:2608. 07532v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern agentic AI systems combine multiple large language model agents with heterogeneous skills, yet most architectures either fix communication in advance or allow full broadcast.
By Mojtaba Eslami
arXiv:2411. 11793v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In federated learning (FL), a central server typically allocates training efforts to clients.
By Kang Liu, Ziqi Wang, Enrique Zuazua
arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.
By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin
arXiv:2608. 10529v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The multi-armed bandit problem is a central framework in sequential decision-making, extensively studied under sub-Gaussian reward assumptions.
By Daphne Feng, Ricardo Parada, Lily Jiang, Sophia Yi, William Chang
arXiv:2602. 16965v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study the decentralized multi-player stochastic bandit problem over a continuous, Lipschitz-structured action space where hard collisions yield zero reward.
By Sourav Chakraborty, Amit Kiran Rege, Claire Monteleoni, Lijun Chen
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
By Wongyu Lee, Francesco Lelli, Omran Ayoub, Massimo Tornatore
arXiv:2603. 03741v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: To improve generalization and resilience in human-robot collaboration (HRC), robots must contend with diverse combinations of human behaviors and contexts, motivating multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL).
By Hao Zhang, Yaru Niu, Yikai Wang, Ding Zhao, H. Eric Tseng