arXiv Machine Learning By Kang Liu, Ziqi Wang, Enrique Zuazua

Nonlinear Equilibrium Transitions in a Potential Game Model for Federated Learning

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arXiv:2411. 11793v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In federated learning (FL), a central server typically allocates training efforts to clients.

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