arXiv Machine Learning By Cengis Hasan

Stable and Budget-Feasible Coalition Formation for Clustered Federated Learning: A Hedonic Potential-Game Approach

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

arXiv:2607. 26788v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Clustered federated learning benefits from organizing heterogeneous participants into coalitions that train coalition-specific models, but such clustering is sustainable only if participants prefer their assigned coalition and the required transfers are affordable.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.

arXiv AI
Sep 24

Evolutionary Stability Does Not Guarantee Learning Accessibility: A Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Perspective on Cooperation Emergence

The paper investigates whether evolutionary stability guarantees that learning agents can achieve cooperative outcomes in a multi‑agent setting. Using a three‑agent governance game, the authors compare the evolutionary basin of attraction with learning basins derived from independent Q‑learning, scaled Boltzmann exploration, and SA–EA BQL. They find that while the evolutionary basin covers the entire sampled grid, only ε‑greedy Q‑learning attains a substantial learning basin, whereas the other methods fail to sustain cooperation, highlighting a disconnect between population‑level stability and finite‑sample learning accessibility.

By Yijie Wang
arXiv AI
5d ago

Dynamic Welfare-Maximizing Pooled Testing

The paper studies a budget‑constrained welfare problem for pooled testing, where agents have heterogeneous utilities and independent probabilities of being healthy. It proves that an optimal dynamic testing policy can achieve at most twice the welfare of the best static overlapping allocation, regardless of population, budget, or pool‑size limit. The authors also identify cases where adaptivity offers no benefit, show that re‑pooling after positive tests is necessary for strict gains, and provide approximation guarantees for greedy algorithms.

By Edwin Lock, Nicholas Lopez, Francisco Marmolejo-Coss\'io, Jose Roberto Tello Ayala, David C. Parkes
arXiv AI
3d ago

Learning to Harvest Without Collapse in a Regenerative Commons: A Lagrangian Framework

The paper introduces a Lagrangian framework for managing a regenerative commons, framing the problem as a constrained Markov game with a specified depletion budget. It constructs policy sequences from unconstrained solutions, extending time‑average concepts to reset episodes with discounted rewards and terminal costs, and provides theoretical guarantees such as reward‑independent feasibility, cooperative feasibility, and approximate optimality. Experiments on a fishery model using constrained IPPO and MAPPO illustrate how depletion budgets influence stock retention, harvest rewards, and price adaptation.

By Jose Tupayachi, Xueping Li, Soham Das