arXiv AI
Aug 25

Reinforcing the World's Edge: A Continual Learning Problem in the Multi-Agent-World Boundary

The paper studies a stationary decentralized Markov game where a focal agent experiences drifting rewards and dynamics due to learning peers, framing this as an agent‑centric continual reinforcement‑learning problem. It introduces the concept of an invariant core—maximal abstract patterns common to many successful trajectories—and proves a worst‑case conditioning theorem linking trajectory‑law drift to success coverage. The authors provide theoretical guarantees for survival horizon, first‑exit law, and regret, and validate their predictions with solvable models and empirical studies in continual control, cue‑MNIST, and Level‑Based Foraging.

By Dane Malenfant
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 17

What preferences can - and cannot - predict in multi-agent online learning

arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).

By Omar Abbadi, Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos
arXiv Machine Learning
1d ago

Online Generalized-Mean Welfare Maximization: Achieving Near-Optimal Regret from Samples

The paper investigates online fair allocation of sequential items to agents with heterogeneous preferences, aiming to maximize generalized-mean welfare. In an i.i.d. arrival setting, a pure greedy algorithm achieves near-optimal “~O(1/T)” average regret without needing distributional knowledge. For nonstationary arrivals, the authors show that a single historical sample per distribution suffices to recover the same regret rate, using re-solving algorithms that remain robust to distribution shifts.

By Zongjun Yang, Rachitesh Kumar, Christian Kroer