The paper studies a stationary decentralized Markov game where a focal agent experiences drifting rewards and dynamics due to learning peers, framing this as an agent‑centric continual reinforcement‑learning problem. It introduces the concept of an invariant core—maximal abstract patterns common to many successful trajectories—and proves a worst‑case conditioning theorem linking trajectory‑law drift to success coverage. The authors provide theoretical guarantees for survival horizon, first‑exit law, and regret, and validate their predictions with solvable models and empirical studies in continual control, cue‑MNIST, and Level‑Based Foraging.
By Dane Malenfant
arXiv:2609.37660v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study nonpreemptive contextual queueing bandits in a single-server system. Each job is represented by a $d$-dimensional context vector; in each roun...
By Wansoo Choi, Seoungbin Bae, Dabeen Lee
arXiv:2609.23773v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Decentralised federated learning replaces server aggregation with peer-to-peer model exchange, making collaborator selection a local decision under u...
By Ke Xiao, Qiyuan Wang, Christos Anagnostopoulos
arXiv:2607. 16895v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safe adaptive control is online adaptation under a safety guarantee on the learning trajectory itself.
By Venkatesh Saligrama
arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).
By Omar Abbadi, Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos
The paper investigates online fair allocation of sequential items to agents with heterogeneous preferences, aiming to maximize generalized-mean welfare. In an i.i.d. arrival setting, a pure greedy algorithm achieves near-optimal “~O(1/T)” average regret without needing distributional knowledge. For nonstationary arrivals, the authors show that a single historical sample per distribution suffices to recover the same regret rate, using re-solving algorithms that remain robust to distribution shifts.
By Zongjun Yang, Rachitesh Kumar, Christian Kroer
arXiv:2610. 01181v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We consider stochastic games with independent controlled chains and unknown transition kernels, where players observe only their local states and realized payoffs.
By S. Rasoul Etesami
arXiv:2607. 14877v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reachability is the most fundamental logical objective, yet it is notoriously difficult to learn in reinforcement learning settings: even for Markov decision processes, PAC learning of reachability is impossible without additional assumptions.
By Ali Asadi, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Pavol Kebis
arXiv:2606. 00835v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Network routers that enforce Quality-of-Service (QoS) guarantees must decide, at every clock cycle, which expiring packet of information to transmit, even when the value of the packet is unknown until it is processed.
By Gianmarco Genalti, Achraf Azize, Vianney Perchet
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
By Panayotis Mertikopoulos
arXiv:2609. 14959v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $\alpha$-potential games.
By S. Rasoul Etesami
arXiv:2606. 09668v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Contextual queueing bandits provide a framework for learning to schedule heterogeneous jobs under unknown context-dependent service rates.
By Seoungbin Bae, Dabeen Lee