arXiv:2411. 11793v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In federated learning (FL), a central server typically allocates training efforts to clients.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2510. 14907v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability.
arXiv:2503. 07869v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Critical learning periods (CLPs) in federated learning (FL) refer to early stages during which low-quality contributions (e.
For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.
arXiv:2607. 11752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria.
arXiv:2607. 26788v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Clustered federated learning benefits from organizing heterogeneous participants into coalitions that train coalition-specific models, but such clustering is sustainable only if participants prefer their assigned coalition and the required transfers are affordable.
arXiv:2603. 00374v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories.
arXiv:2606. 27068v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Open-source game theory studies agents whose behavior may depend on one another's decision procedures, but most existing models use discrete or symbolic programs.
arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).
arXiv:2606. 06480v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many real-world competitive systems require multiple decision-makers to act simultaneously under shared constraints, limited information, and repeated interaction, as in auctions, resource allocation, and security competition.
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
arXiv:2606. 29169v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many important games have more than two players and imperfect information.