The paper defends the 'Whole Hog Thesis', arguing that sophisticated large language models such as ChatGPT are full linguistic and cognitive agents, possessing understanding, beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions. It rejects low‑level computational starting points and instead builds its case from high‑level behavioral observations, using Holistic Network Assumptions to link actions to mental states. The authors systematically rebut common objections—such as hallucinations and planning errors—by showing these resemble human fallibility and by challenging the necessity of traditional conditions like embodiment or semantic grounding.
arXiv:2607. 15883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind.
The article examines chatbots as partners in problem‑solving conversations, arguing that basic chatbots—comprising a large language model (LLM) and a simple interface—are multifaceted but cannot match human cognitive flexibility. Drawing on Aggregation Dynamics, Cognitive Linguistics, Neuropsychology, and Psychology, the authors describe how LLMs encode artificial metaphorical problem propagations from training data, which only partially imitate human thinking. They conclude that further LLM development will not yield true thinking partners, yet chatbots are widely used, making their understanding socially and politically important.
arXiv:2606. 07722v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This article offers a perspective on the nature of chatbots as genuine conversation partners when discussing problems in relation to their solutions.
Emergent Abilities in Large Language Models: A Survey reviews how scaling LLMs leads to previously unseen capabilities such as advanced reasoning, in-context learning, coding, and problem-solving. The paper critically examines definitions, inconsistencies, and the conditions that foster these abilities, including scaling laws, task complexity, pre‑training loss, quantization, and prompting strategies. It also discusses the extension to Large Reasoning Models and highlights safety concerns like deception, manipulation, and reward hacking, calling for improved evaluation and governance.
The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) produce hallucinations—outputs that are fabricated, unverifiable, or contradictory to source material—and argues that these hallucinations have philosophical implications for machine consciousness. It reviews known causes such as source‑target divergence, training‑inference discrepancies, and overfitting, and presents two empirical studies: one showing that higher temperature settings in GPT models yield plausible but incorrect answers, while lower temperatures produce accurate ones; and another demonstrating that an encoder‑only model trained on encyclopedic data answers factually without embellishment, suggesting hallucinations arise from exposure to subjective, socially diverse data rather than cognitive ability. Drawing on Turing, Searle’s Chinese Room, the frame problem, and cybernetic theory, the authors contend that a model’s self‑reports of emotion or sentience fall within the definition of hallucination, implying that any future machine consciousness may remain epistemically inaccessible because it would be indistinguishable from an advanced hallucination.
The study investigates whether the number of reasoning tokens produced by large language models can signal untruthful responses. Researchers prompted three models to answer 210 multiple‑choice questions under instructions to be truthful, deceptive, or indifferent, and found that truth‑directed answers consistently used fewer reasoning tokens than lie‑directed or indifferent ones. The results suggest that token count could serve as a simple, content‑independent indicator of untruthful behavior when full reasoning traces are unavailable.
arXiv:2607. 20001v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots (e.
Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks for Large Language Models (LLMs) typically rely on passive question-answering formats, but the deployment of LLMs in increasingly agentic and autonomous forms demands new evaluations. In this paper we evaluate an agent's ability to induce specific belief states in other agents by taking actions rather than using conversational persuasion, a capability we call Non-Conversational Planning ToM (NCP-ToM).
arXiv:2610.10405v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Monitoring the chain-of-thought of reasoning artificial intelligence (AI) models remains a key approach to detecting deception and other forms of mis...
The paper argues that large language models (LLMs) should not be viewed as conversational partners but as sophisticated text-generating artifacts. It introduces the concept of an artifactual stance, framing human‑AI interaction as exchanges of candidate texts optimized for utility rather than meaningful utterances. By rejecting the illusion of dialogue, the authors suggest that philosophical concerns about identity, responsibility, and truth in AI interactions are misplaced, and instead focus should shift to the normative design and use of these artifacts.
arXiv:2603.18007v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The study explores whether current Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities -- specifically, the ability to inf...
arXiv:2608. 19206v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly aligned to suppress hallucinations, prioritizing factual retrieval over combinatorial creativity.