The paper defends the 'Whole Hog Thesis', arguing that sophisticated large language models such as ChatGPT are full linguistic and cognitive agents, possessing understanding, beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions. It rejects low‑level computational starting points and instead builds its case from high‑level behavioral observations, using Holistic Network Assumptions to link actions to mental states. The authors systematically rebut common objections—such as hallucinations and planning errors—by showing these resemble human fallibility and by challenging the necessity of traditional conditions like embodiment or semantic grounding.
By Herman Cappelen, Josh Dever
arXiv:2509. 14474v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The debate around Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) remains open due to two fundamentally different goals: replicating human-level performance versus replicating human-like cognitive processes.
By Meltem Subasioglu, Nevzat Subasioglu
arXiv:2605. 31514v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Much research has been carried out on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-powered agentic workflows.
By Adrian de Wynter
arXiv:2609.35618v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a c...
By Shamil Chandaria, Arvo Mu\~noz Mor\'an, Fernando Rosas, Anil Seth, Henry Shevlin, Marcus Hutter, Thore Graepel, Adam Bales, Iulia Comsa, Murray Shanahan, Ruben Laukkonen, Morten Kringelbach, Chris Frith, Shane Legg
arXiv:2606. 23991v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: What is an agent?
By Eric Xing, Mingkai Deng, Jinyu Hou
Emergent Abilities in Large Language Models: A Survey reviews how scaling LLMs leads to previously unseen capabilities such as advanced reasoning, in-context learning, coding, and problem-solving. The paper critically examines definitions, inconsistencies, and the conditions that foster these abilities, including scaling laws, task complexity, pre‑training loss, quantization, and prompting strategies. It also discusses the extension to Large Reasoning Models and highlights safety concerns like deception, manipulation, and reward hacking, calling for improved evaluation and governance.
By Leonardo Berti, Flavio Giorgi, Gjergji Kasneci
arXiv:2608. 01548v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language can be viewed as a formalized subset of thought: a consequence-governed symbolic structure projected from wider situated cognition.
By Yi Liu
The paper introduces the Situated Identity Test (SIT), a framework that assesses whether a language model’s behavior can be traced to a specific developmental lineage rather than merely imitating a persona. SIT requires agents to possess accurate knowledge of their recorded experiences while appropriately ignoring ungrounded information, and it demonstrates that policies based only on compressed profiles are limited in distinguishing between colliding life histories. The authors present SITBench, an evaluation suite with 25 profile‑collision pairs and 10,000 probes across nine model architectures, and provide open‑source tools and pilot results on state‑of‑the‑art foundation models.
By Jun He, Deying Yu
Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks for Large Language Models (LLMs) typically rely on passive question-answering formats, but the deployment of LLMs in increasingly agentic and autonomous forms demands new evaluations. In this paper we evaluate an agent's ability to induce specific belief states in other agents by taking actions rather than using conversational persuasion, a capability we call Non-Conversational Planning ToM (NCP-ToM).
The paper argues that the current debate on machine consciousness rests on the mistaken assumption that AI systems are already the kind of entities that could possess consciousness. By distinguishing between phenomenal consciousness, introspective report, and human projective introspection, it introduces the AI Consciousness Fallacy, showing that generative models can produce first‑person linguistic traces without being conscious. It then proposes Causal Liability Theory (CLT), with CLT‑I defining liability closure as a criterion for identifying a bearer of consciousness and CLT‑II suggesting that liability closure is both necessary and sufficient for minimal phenomenal subjecthood, and demonstrates experimentally that these distinctions are tractable and can separate causal bearer structure from first‑person performance.
By Afshin Khadangi
arXiv:2607. 15495v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Out of everything the human brain processes, only a small fraction is consciously accessible, in the sense of being available for verbal report, deliberate control, and flexible reasoning.
By Wes Gurnee, Nicholas Sofroniew, Adam Pearce, Mateusz Piotrowski, Isaac Kauvar, Runjin Chen, Anna Soligo, Paul Bogdan, Euan Ong, Rowan Wang, Ben Thompson, David Abrahams, Subhash Kantamneni, Emmanuel Ameisen, Joshua Batson, Jack Lindsey
In long, multi-turn dialogue a large language model maintains an implicit relational stance toward the user, spanning from "push the user toward real-world others" to "position itself as the user's sole support. " When it slides toward the latter, "support" degrades into "you only have me" -- a harm documented in real companion conversations (Moore et al.