arXiv:2606. 17945v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models provide a tractable system for asking how intelligence itself emerges, rather than only how LLMs can be engineered.
By Liangkai Hang, Junjie Yao, Zhiyu Li, Feiyu Xiong, Hongkang Yang, Zhi-Qin John Xu
The paper argues that large language models need adaptive reasoning rather than fixed reasoning budgets. It shows that over‑reasoning leads to high computational cost without accuracy gains, while under‑reasoning results in incorrect or incomplete solutions. The authors evaluate these failure modes on MATH‑500 and the GAIA benchmark, highlighting the need for dynamic reasoning allocation in agentic AI systems.
By Md Jueal Mia, M. Hadi Amini
MEA is a multi‑agent framework that automates the selection and configuration of explanation tools for machine learning models across tabular, text, and vision data. A Proposer agent chooses appropriate tools based on the question and modality, while an Actor agent is trained end‑to‑end for faithfulness, producing natural‑language explanations. Experiments show that MEA outperforms existing post‑hoc explainers and closed‑source baselines, achieving significant faithfulness gains on six datasets.
By Yuyang Cheng, Raghav Kaushik Ravi, Srivarshinee Sridhar, Sriparna Saha, Akash Ghosh, Chirag Agarwal
The paper defends the 'Whole Hog Thesis', arguing that sophisticated large language models such as ChatGPT are full linguistic and cognitive agents, possessing understanding, beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions. It rejects low‑level computational starting points and instead builds its case from high‑level behavioral observations, using Holistic Network Assumptions to link actions to mental states. The authors systematically rebut common objections—such as hallucinations and planning errors—by showing these resemble human fallibility and by challenging the necessity of traditional conditions like embodiment or semantic grounding.
By Herman Cappelen, Josh Dever
The study investigates whether the number of reasoning tokens produced by large language models can signal untruthful responses. Researchers prompted three models to answer 210 multiple‑choice questions under instructions to be truthful, deceptive, or indifferent, and found that truth‑directed answers consistently used fewer reasoning tokens than lie‑directed or indifferent ones. The results suggest that token count could serve as a simple, content‑independent indicator of untruthful behavior when full reasoning traces are unavailable.
By Maverick Morales, Tom\'a\v{s} Dominik, Vermut Gao, Katrina Shirey, Paulius Rimkevi\v{c}ius, Aaron Schurger, Uri Maoz
arXiv:2609.01491v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: The growing rate at which LLM agents interact with one another raises key questions about language evolution in multi-LLM-agent settings, with implic...
By Elias Stengel-Eskin, Newton Sander, Carlos Bonetti, Sasha Boguraev, James Bowler, Hale Sirin, Simon Kirby