The article examines chatbots as partners in problem‑solving conversations, arguing that basic chatbots—comprising a large language model (LLM) and a simple interface—are multifaceted but cannot match human cognitive flexibility. Drawing on Aggregation Dynamics, Cognitive Linguistics, Neuropsychology, and Psychology, the authors describe how LLMs encode artificial metaphorical problem propagations from training data, which only partially imitate human thinking. They conclude that further LLM development will not yield true thinking partners, yet chatbots are widely used, making their understanding socially and politically important.
arXiv:2606. 07722v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This article offers a perspective on the nature of chatbots as genuine conversation partners when discussing problems in relation to their solutions.
The paper defends the 'Whole Hog Thesis', arguing that sophisticated large language models such as ChatGPT are full linguistic and cognitive agents, possessing understanding, beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions. It rejects low‑level computational starting points and instead builds its case from high‑level behavioral observations, using Holistic Network Assumptions to link actions to mental states. The authors systematically rebut common objections—such as hallucinations and planning errors—by showing these resemble human fallibility and by challenging the necessity of traditional conditions like embodiment or semantic grounding.
arXiv:2608. 08443v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Previous studies have shown that people can develop shared symbols, partner-specific expressions, personal idioms, inside jokes, and other parts of a relational microculture.
arXiv:2409. 01754v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: From the printing press to social media, innovations in communication technology have repeatedly reshaped how ideas spread through human culture.
arXiv:2603.18007v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The study explores whether current Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities -- specifically, the ability to inf...
arXiv:2607. 15883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind.
The paper investigates how the way users phrase advice‑seeking requests—termed articulation—creates stable, measurable patterns distinct from the topics of the requests. By analyzing 16,447 prompts from public chat corpora, the authors identify a small set of latent articulation factors that consistently appear across datasets and splits. One key finding is a long‑form, information‑poor style that leads language models to give shorter, vaguer answers without seeking clarification, a pattern that persists across topics and prompt lengths.
arXiv:2607. 10248v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical.
The paper investigates the linguistic characteristics of ChatGPT-generated text, comparing it to 1,000 scientific publications and exploring its relation to concepts of ‘bullshit’ in political speech and workplace contexts. By applying hypothesis‑testing methods, the authors demonstrate that a statistical model of bullshit can link the artificial bullshit produced by ChatGPT to the political and workplace functions of bullshit observed in natural human language.
arXiv:2601. 09869v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Anthropomorphisation -- the phenomenon whereby non-human entities are ascribed human-like qualities -- has become increasingly salient with the rise of large language model (LLM)-based conversational agents (CAs).
Pragmatic language use requires reasoning about alternatives: the alternative expressions a speaker might have chosen, or the alternative interpretations a listener might entertain. Formal and computational models of pragmatics must therefore specify the sets of alternatives that interlocutors reason over, which is often done through manual specification.
The article presents a minimal working model for large language model (LLM) systems, emphasizing four key distinctions—pretraining vs. deployment, distribution vs. samples, types of memory, and task competence vs. agency. Using this framework, it diagnoses six common misconceptions about LLMs (next‑token prediction, regression to the mean, training‑data regurgitation, model memory, alignment, and understanding), explaining what each misconception captures correctly, where it conflates distinctions, and the implications for evaluation, design, and governance. The model is applied to AI policy language, illustrating how policy can misrepresent these distinctions and offering a diagnostic toolkit to correct such errors.