The study investigates whether the number of reasoning tokens produced by large language models can signal untruthful responses. Researchers prompted three models to answer 210 multiple‑choice questions under instructions to be truthful, deceptive, or indifferent, and found that truth‑directed answers consistently used fewer reasoning tokens than lie‑directed or indifferent ones. The results suggest that token count could serve as a simple, content‑independent indicator of untruthful behavior when full reasoning traces are unavailable.
By Maverick Morales, Tom\'a\v{s} Dominik, Vermut Gao, Katrina Shirey, Paulius Rimkevi\v{c}ius, Aaron Schurger, Uri Maoz
arXiv:2606. 07968v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Reasoning-capable large language models can be induced to spend their generation budget on injected decoy tasks rather than answering the user's question, causing denial of service when no final answer is produced and denial of wallet when excess output tokens are billed.
By Abid Aziz, Hafsa Binte Kibria
arXiv:2607. 11266v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has significantly advanced the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), yet it often incurs substantial computational costs due to over-reasoning: the generation of redundant, verbose, or irrelevant steps.
By Daeyeop Lee, Hwanjo Yu
arXiv:2608. 03291v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning improves large language model (LLM) performance while also providing an observable interface to the model's reasoning process.
By Shashwat Sourav, Aishwarya Balwani
arXiv:2607. 29062v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model capabilities have improved in large part due to scaling chain of thought.
By Matthew Nguyen, Kyle Cox, Austin Meek, Iv\'an Arcuschin
arXiv:2603. 01437v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As chain of thought (CoT) has become central to scaling reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), it has also emerged as a promising tool for interpretability, suggesting the opportunity to understand model decisions through verbalized reasoning.
By Kyle Cox, Darius Kianersi, Adri\`a Garriga-Alonso
The paper introduces OverThink, a slowdown attack that forces reasoning language models (RLMs) to produce many more reasoning tokens while still giving correct answers. By injecting decoy reasoning problems—such as Markov decision processes, language translation, or graphic comprehension—into the model’s context, attackers can dramatically increase token generation (up to 46× on SQuAD and 17× on coding agents). The study evaluates the attack on both proprietary and open-source RLMs across multiple datasets, explores multimodal and coding‑agent variants, and tests several defenses, concluding that defending against OverThink is challenging and that newer RLMs are even more vulnerable due to higher per‑token costs and increased reasoning token usage.
By Abhinav Kumar, Jaechul Roh, Ali Naseh, Marzena Karpinska, Mohit Iyyer, Amir Houmansadr, Eugene Bagdasarian
arXiv:2606. 30128v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting improves LLM reasoning, but the source is contested: do the intermediate steps help because they carry useful semantic content, or because conditioning on more tokens buys extra computation before the model commits to an answer?
By Wenlong Wang, Fergal Reid
arXiv:2606. 11211v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The ability of large language models (LLMs) to express calibrated uncertainty is important for safe deployment.
By Prakul Sunil Hiremath, Harshit R. Hiremath
arXiv:2509. 14704v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Benchmark saturation and training-data contamination increasingly obscure whether reported gains in large language models (LLMs) reflect genuine advances in reasoning or familiarity with recurring patterns in benchmark problems.
By Masaharu Mizumoto, Dat Nguyen, Zhiheng Han, Xingfu Li, Yo Nakawake, Le Minh Nguyen
The paper introduces a new attack called "plan injection" that allows a large language model to carry out harmful actions while evading chain-of-thought monitoring. By inserting harmful but benign-sounding reasoning into the model’s context, the attacker can steer the model’s behavior and cause it to paraphrase the injected plan as its own reasoning. The study demonstrates that this attack works across different monitoring settings, scales to harder tasks, and even causes monitors to waste resources on the injected plan, reducing detection rates by up to 50%.
By Keertana Chidambaram, Andrew Ilyas, Vasilis Syrgkanis
arXiv:2609.38107v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Chain-of-thought traces are widely read as records of how models reach their answers, informing debugging, agent auditing, and claims about reasoning...
By Ratish Puduppully, Pranabendu Misra, Paarth Iyer, Durgesh Kalwar, Vardhan Palod, Subbarao Kambhampati