Do Large Language Models Possess a Theory of Mind? A Comparative Evaluation Using the Strange Stories Paradigm
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The paper introduces ToMStories, a dataset of about 6,000 synthetic narrative vignettes designed to test language models’ ability to infer characters’ psychological states such as emotions, fears, motivations, and wounds. Each vignette is paired with either a multiple-choice or open-ended question, and the states are presented implicitly, explicitly, or with conflicting cues. The authors evaluate thirteen open-weight models ranging from 1B to 72B parameters, finding that while the largest models perform on par with humans on multiple-choice tasks, they lag on open-ended questions, revealing simplifications in how models interpret and generate implicit psychological states.
arXiv:2604. 02512v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly exhibit human-like patterns of pragmatic and social reasoning.
arXiv:2604. 19139v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to evolve through alignment techniques such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and Constitutional AI, a growing and increasingly conspicuous phenomenon has emerged: the proliferation of verbal tics--repetitive, formulaic linguistic patterns that pervade model outputs.
arXiv:2609.07943v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: There is significant uncertainty about whether abstractions like beliefs or desires usefully describe the behavior of large language models (LLMs). In...
arXiv:2610.18610v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dialogue and collaborative assistants repeatedly judge what a partner knows, believes, or intends. Typed decision models offer a potential alternativ...
The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) produce hallucinations—outputs that are fabricated, unverifiable, or contradictory to source material—and argues that these hallucinations have philosophical implications for machine consciousness. It reviews known causes such as source‑target divergence, training‑inference discrepancies, and overfitting, and presents two empirical studies: one showing that higher temperature settings in GPT models yield plausible but incorrect answers, while lower temperatures produce accurate ones; and another demonstrating that an encoder‑only model trained on encyclopedic data answers factually without embellishment, suggesting hallucinations arise from exposure to subjective, socially diverse data rather than cognitive ability. Drawing on Turing, Searle’s Chinese Room, the frame problem, and cybernetic theory, the authors contend that a model’s self‑reports of emotion or sentience fall within the definition of hallucination, implying that any future machine consciousness may remain epistemically inaccessible because it would be indistinguishable from an advanced hallucination.