The paper introduces ToMStories, a dataset of about 6,000 synthetic narrative vignettes designed to test language models’ ability to infer characters’ psychological states such as emotions, fears, motivations, and wounds. Each vignette is paired with either a multiple-choice or open-ended question, and the states are presented implicitly, explicitly, or with conflicting cues. The authors evaluate thirteen open-weight models ranging from 1B to 72B parameters, finding that while the largest models perform on par with humans on multiple-choice tasks, they lag on open-ended questions, revealing simplifications in how models interpret and generate implicit psychological states.
By Melanie Subbiah, Chia-En Jacklyn Tsai, Kathleen McKeown
arXiv:2604. 02512v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly exhibit human-like patterns of pragmatic and social reasoning.
By Roland M\"uhlenbernd
arXiv:2604. 19139v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to evolve through alignment techniques such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and Constitutional AI, a growing and increasingly conspicuous phenomenon has emerged: the proliferation of verbal tics--repetitive, formulaic linguistic patterns that pervade model outputs.
By Shuai Wu, Xue Li, Yanna Feng, Yufang Li, Zhijun Wang, Ran Wang
arXiv:2609.07943v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: There is significant uncertainty about whether abstractions like beliefs or desires usefully describe the behavior of large language models (LLMs). In...
By Alex Smolin, Bryan Wilder
arXiv:2610.18610v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Dialogue and collaborative assistants repeatedly judge what a partner knows, believes, or intends. Typed decision models offer a potential alternativ...
By Kawai Chung, Chunkit Chan, Yuxuan Liu, Yauwai Yim, Xi Yang, Wenbin Hu, Huihao Jing, Chiu Yeung Tang, Changxuan Fan, Ki Sen Hung, Tsun On Kwok, Haoran Li
The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) produce hallucinations—outputs that are fabricated, unverifiable, or contradictory to source material—and argues that these hallucinations have philosophical implications for machine consciousness. It reviews known causes such as source‑target divergence, training‑inference discrepancies, and overfitting, and presents two empirical studies: one showing that higher temperature settings in GPT models yield plausible but incorrect answers, while lower temperatures produce accurate ones; and another demonstrating that an encoder‑only model trained on encyclopedic data answers factually without embellishment, suggesting hallucinations arise from exposure to subjective, socially diverse data rather than cognitive ability. Drawing on Turing, Searle’s Chinese Room, the frame problem, and cybernetic theory, the authors contend that a model’s self‑reports of emotion or sentience fall within the definition of hallucination, implying that any future machine consciousness may remain epistemically inaccessible because it would be indistinguishable from an advanced hallucination.
By Kristina \v{S}ekrst
The paper defends the 'Whole Hog Thesis', arguing that sophisticated large language models such as ChatGPT are full linguistic and cognitive agents, possessing understanding, beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions. It rejects low‑level computational starting points and instead builds its case from high‑level behavioral observations, using Holistic Network Assumptions to link actions to mental states. The authors systematically rebut common objections—such as hallucinations and planning errors—by showing these resemble human fallibility and by challenging the necessity of traditional conditions like embodiment or semantic grounding.
By Herman Cappelen, Josh Dever
Jev-ToM evaluates Theory of Mind (ToM) in typed decision models, comparing five such models and seven generative baselines on 11,117 English text questions from nine ToM benchmarks across six capability groups. The TypeSafe Jev model achieves 73.2% source‑balanced accuracy, ranking first or second in all six capabilities, including leading beliefs, goals/desires/intentions, and emotions. Other typed models show distinct strengths, and resource comparisons suggest Jev could reduce cost and waiting time for repeated ToM selection, while confidence‑based selection and candidate expansion reveal task‑dependent challenges and opportunities for improvement.
Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks for Large Language Models (LLMs) typically rely on passive question-answering formats, but the deployment of LLMs in increasingly agentic and autonomous forms demands new evaluations. In this paper we evaluate an agent's ability to induce specific belief states in other agents by taking actions rather than using conversational persuasion, a capability we call Non-Conversational Planning ToM (NCP-ToM).
arXiv:2607. 15495v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Out of everything the human brain processes, only a small fraction is consciously accessible, in the sense of being available for verbal report, deliberate control, and flexible reasoning.
By Wes Gurnee, Nicholas Sofroniew, Adam Pearce, Mateusz Piotrowski, Isaac Kauvar, Runjin Chen, Anna Soligo, Paul Bogdan, Euan Ong, Rowan Wang, Ben Thompson, David Abrahams, Subhash Kantamneni, Emmanuel Ameisen, Joshua Batson, Jack Lindsey
The study evaluates how well language‑model agents can simulate individual social media reactions by comparing predictions under different prompt conditions. Eight Serbian participants’ reactions to 68 posts were recorded, and four language models were asked to predict these reactions using prompts that varied in profile content and instruction style. The results show that prompts emphasizing attitudinal content and intuitive, immediate responses yield the highest fidelity, outperforming demographic backstories and a crowd baseline, and suggesting that such agents could act as general‑purpose simulated users.
By Ljubisa Bojic, Tijana Stanic, Joerg Matthes, Agariadne Dwinggo Samala, Bojana Dinic, Jue Wang
The study evaluates mentalization—the capacity to infer others’ beliefs and intentions—in large language models (LLMs) using two economic games and cognitive computational modeling. Researchers tested 2,099 LLM agents from four model families (DeepSeek, GPT‑4.1, GPT‑5, Gemini 2.0 Flash) against opponents of varying sophistication, comparing their performance to 251 human participants. Results show that LLMs exhibit distinct mentalizing behaviors that vary by model provider and size, with strategic prompting generally enhancing performance; notably, GPT‑5 agents adapt their recursive reasoning depth to match opponent sophistication, outperforming humans in one task.
By Aamir Sohail, Xintong Zhong, Arkady Konovalov, Patricia L. Lockwood, Lei Zhang