arXiv:2606. 07722v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This article offers a perspective on the nature of chatbots as genuine conversation partners when discussing problems in relation to their solutions.
By S. F. M. van Vlijmen, H. D. Lethe jr
The paper defends the 'Whole Hog Thesis', arguing that sophisticated large language models such as ChatGPT are full linguistic and cognitive agents, possessing understanding, beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions. It rejects low‑level computational starting points and instead builds its case from high‑level behavioral observations, using Holistic Network Assumptions to link actions to mental states. The authors systematically rebut common objections—such as hallucinations and planning errors—by showing these resemble human fallibility and by challenging the necessity of traditional conditions like embodiment or semantic grounding.
By Herman Cappelen, Josh Dever
The paper argues that new interactional concepts are needed to understand how humans change when engaging with large language models (LLMs). Drawing on enactive theory and the notion of Linguistic Bodies, it proposes that humans incorporate LLMs both as tools that enable specific skills and as linguistic partners that shape identity and language use. The authors introduce the idea of "susceptive sense‑making" to describe the heightened semiotic labor involved when friction is absent in these interactions, and suggest that this dynamic may affect users’ autonomy and development.
By Elena C. Cuffari, Marta P\'erez-Verdugo, Xabier E. Barandiaran
arXiv:2608. 08443v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Previous studies have shown that people can develop shared symbols, partner-specific expressions, personal idioms, inside jokes, and other parts of a relational microculture.
By Miki Ueno
arXiv:2502.09192v3 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human traits to technology, is an automatic and unconscious response that occurs even in those with advance...
By Lujain Ibrahim, Myra Cheng
The paper argues that large language models (LLMs) should not be viewed as conversational partners but as sophisticated text-generating artifacts. It introduces the concept of an artifactual stance, framing human‑AI interaction as exchanges of candidate texts optimized for utility rather than meaningful utterances. By rejecting the illusion of dialogue, the authors suggest that philosophical concerns about identity, responsibility, and truth in AI interactions are misplaced, and instead focus should shift to the normative design and use of these artifacts.
By James Ravi Kirkpatrick, Alexandru Radulescu, Rachel Katharine Sterken