AI losses that arise through an insured organization's generative or agentic AI system require state reconstruction, not merely event reconstruction, because the relevant state changes as the system reasons, retrieves, calls tools, and acts. The relevant question is not only what loss occurred, but what the system was allowed to do, what it actually did, and whether that reconstructed loss can support insurance claim recovery.
arXiv:2605. 18784v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The rapid diffusion of agentic AI has created a new coverage problem for commercial insurance: some AI-mediated losses are now affirmatively insured, some create silent-AI exposure under legacy cyber, technology errors-and-omissions (E&O), directors-and-officers (D&O), employment practices liability (EPLI), crime, and media policies, and others are being actively excluded.
By Alex Leung, Rex Zhang, Ervin Ling, Kentaroh Toyoda, SiewMei Loh
arXiv:2609. 11030v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations.
By Divyanshu Kumar, Rohith HN, Nitin Aravind Birur, Sahil Agarwal, Prashanth Harshangi
arXiv:2608.22160v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Physical automation is scaling toward fleets of embodied machines commanded by an AI brain. Early deployments already run factories and warehouses at p...
By Zhixu Du, Yiran Chen
AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations. We...
arXiv:2606. 05449v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic artificial intelligence (AI) systems are transforming the risk landscape by extending beyond information generation to autonomous planning, tool invocation, decision execution, and persistent modification of digital and physical environments.
By Quanyan Zhu
The paper reports a failure study of a production agentic software‑delivery platform, analyzing 147 incidents across 81 runs. It shows that the standard reliability primitives—retry, timeout, and error‑rate circuit breaking—fail in practice, leading to costly loops, false trips, and blocked work. The authors identify two cross‑cutting causes—identity adequacy and evidence adequacy—and propose seven new reliability primitives that enforce reliability at the delegation level.
By Mazhar Shaikh, Anurag Rajkumar Bombarde, Harshal Pathak
arXiv:2608.22512v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Autonomous multi-agent systems nowadays act in finance, software supply chains, and security operations. Already, the first largely AI-orchestrated int...
By Christos Sardianos, Iliana Pla, Vasilis Efthymiou, Iraklis Varlamis, Thomas Lagkas, Panagiotis Sarigiannidis, Georgios Th. Papadopoulos
arXiv:2607. 19292v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios.
By Gjergji Kasneci, Enkelejda Kasneci
arXiv:2606. 05461v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety standards for ML-based autonomous driving specify the kind of evidence an assurance case must contain (directed cause-and-effect chains, quantified interventional effects, named root-cause variables), yet the XAI literature is organised by output type and technique family (saliency maps, feature attribution, counterfactuals, causal graphs, language traces).
By Abhinaw Priyadershi, Mandar Pitale, Jelena Frtunikj, Maria Spence
The paper introduces a claim‑safe protocol for evaluating closed‑loop AI systems, consisting of three actions: Refuse, Decompose, and Refresh. It demonstrates the protocol in a simulator with 24 policy components and 1,440 held‑out cases, showing that abstention and stable false admission rates are low while providing detailed statistical diagnostics. The approach emphasizes that evaluation results should be tied to observable support and statistical calibration rather than a single PASS/FAIL label.
By Peiying Zhu, Sidi Chang
The paper proposes an independence‑graded audit protocol for agentic AI systems, arguing that independence should be evaluated along three orthogonal axes: principal independence, substrate independence, and evidence independence. It introduces a seven‑step protocol based on the beta‑factor model from reliability engineering, demonstrates its application through a structural detectability analysis and a Monte Carlo study, and maps the framework to relevant regulatory standards such as the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42006, and UK public‑sector guidance.
By Mohamed Chahine Ghanem