AI losses that arise through an insured organization's generative or agentic AI system require state reconstruction, not merely event reconstruction, because the relevant state changes as the system reasons, retrieves, calls tools, and acts. The relevant question is not only what loss occurred, but what the system was allowed to do, what it actually did, and whether that reconstructed loss can support insurance claim recovery.
arXiv:2606. 03777v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI losses that arise through an insured organization's generative or agentic AI system require state reconstruction, not merely event reconstruction, because the relevant state changes as the system reasons, retrieves, calls tools, and acts.
arXiv:2605. 18784v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The rapid diffusion of agentic AI has created a new coverage problem for commercial insurance: some AI-mediated losses are now affirmatively insured, some create silent-AI exposure under legacy cyber, technology errors-and-omissions (E&O), directors-and-officers (D&O), employment practices liability (EPLI), crime, and media policies, and others are being actively excluded.
arXiv:2606. 05449v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic artificial intelligence (AI) systems are transforming the risk landscape by extending beyond information generation to autonomous planning, tool invocation, decision execution, and persistent modification of digital and physical environments.
arXiv:2607. 19292v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios.
arXiv:2606. 16465v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents can now take irreversible actions in operational systems, but agent-caused losses are still not clearly assigned, priced, or transferred.
arXiv:2607. 18243v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic AI is crossing trust boundaries faster than current risk models can represent.
arXiv:2608. 13867v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI coding agents are commonly evaluated as models but deployed as systems.
arXiv:2606. 05461v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety standards for ML-based autonomous driving specify the kind of evidence an assurance case must contain (directed cause-and-effect chains, quantified interventional effects, named root-cause variables), yet the XAI literature is organised by output type and technique family (saliency maps, feature attribution, counterfactuals, causal graphs, language traces).
Engineering management research has produced mature frameworks for software risk: ownership by feature, escalation by severity, and assurance by test coverage. These frameworks implicitly assume deterministic behavior, discrete and auditable change events, and clear component-to-owner mappings.
arXiv:2607. 01421v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Engineering management research has produced mature frameworks for software risk: ownership by feature, escalation by severity, and assurance by test coverage.
arXiv:2607. 13230v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic AI introduces new insurance challenges because autonomous AI systems can make decisions, invoke tools, modify external environments, and interact with third-party services.
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.