The paper "Auditable Claims about AI Agents" argues that for a claim about an AI agent to be verifiable, it must explicitly state the agent’s policy, scope, the records that would confirm the claim, and who is responsible for those records. It extends the Auditable Agents framework by adding conditions of independent record coverage, action‑specific authorization, and completeness beyond integrity, and demonstrates the approach with a claim‑check table applied to six common claims. The authors provide a worked example and practical guidance for operators, buyers, auditors, and standard setters.
arXiv:2608.22160v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Physical automation is scaling toward fleets of embodied machines commanded by an AI brain. Early deployments already run factories and warehouses at p...
The paper proposes an independence‑graded audit protocol for agentic AI systems, arguing that independence should be evaluated along three orthogonal axes: principal independence, substrate independence, and evidence independence. It introduces a seven‑step protocol based on the beta‑factor model from reliability engineering, demonstrates its application through a structural detectability analysis and a Monte Carlo study, and maps the framework to relevant regulatory standards such as the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42006, and UK public‑sector guidance.
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.
The paper introduces Runtime Assurance Contracts (RAC) as a formal policy framework for high‑risk AI agents, addressing the "assurance‑transition gap" by binding autonomy boundaries, component eligibility, evidence state, transition policy, human‑review capacity, and non‑compensatory gates. RAC allows soft metrics to influence routing while mandating retries, switches, escalations, deferrals, or stops when mandatory gates fail or are unknown, ensuring aggregate performance cannot alone authorize action. The authors define the contract, evidence record, permission rule, and five invariants, and evaluate RAC through deterministic failure‑injection studies, hand‑authored traces, and a prospective synthetic holdout, comparing it to score‑only and restricted protocol baselines.
arXiv:2609.37457v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enterprise artificial-intelligence agents increasingly call tools, modify infrastructure, and process protected data, creating a need to separate actio...
arXiv:2606. 18021v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI systems deployed in legal workflows hallucinate at rates that aggregate metrics report at ~52%, but this average conceals where errors concentrate and in which direction they run, leaving compliance officers without an actionable signal for trustworthy deployment.
arXiv:2604. 05485v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects.
arXiv:2609. 11030v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations.
AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations. We...
The paper introduces ClaimReceipt, a specification and verifier that checks whether a claim in an agent evaluation can be recomputed from retained evidence (sufficiency) and whether the evidence covers the entire experiment set (coverage). Using the CR‑2 verifier on 1,392 historical records, the authors demonstrate accurate reproduction of audit verdicts, non‑redundant field groups, and zero false positives on semantic faults. In a prospective CR‑3 run, the system correctly flags missing receipts and preserves coverage when private evidence is withheld, while adding minimal overhead to inference time and transaction size.
The paper "When Agents Act Unwatched: The Reduced‑Supervision Paradox in Agentic AI" discusses how the promise that AI systems will continue acting after users stop watching creates an accountability inversion. It argues that as stepwise supervision recedes, verification shifts into the runtime infrastructure—authority, records, interrupts, outcome checks, and repair—forming what the authors call the reduced‑supervision paradox. A 63‑artifact audit across research papers and engineering sources shows that agents’ action surfaces are more visible than the mechanisms needed to hold them accountable, with tool mediation and monitoring traces appearing in 40 and 37 artifacts, while checkpoint placement, validator independence, recovery, and contestability are rarely visible. "whyItMatters":"The study highlights that observable action paths can replace accountability when verification is moved onto users after meaningful intervention is no longer possible."