Hugging Face Trending Papers
The Agent Incident Registry: Toward Preventing Repeated AI Agent Failures
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arXiv AI
Sep 12
The Agent Incident Registry: Toward Preventing Repeated AI Agent Failures
arXiv:2609. 11030v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations.
arXiv AI
Aug 25
AUDITA: certified auditing and causal attribution of adverse outcomes in autonomous multi-agent systems
arXiv:2608.22160v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Physical automation is scaling toward fleets of embodied machines commanded by an AI brain. Early deployments already run factories and warehouses at p...
arXiv AI
Aug 13
Agent Safety Should Be a Runtime Contract
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.
arXiv AI
Aug 25
HANSARD: A Reference Architecture for Forensic Readiness, Runtime Witnessing, and Graded Attribution in Autonomous Multi-Agent AI Systems
arXiv:2608.22512v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous multi-agent systems nowadays act in finance, software supply chains, and security operations. Already, the first largely AI-orchestrated int...
arXiv AI
Sep 23
Beyond Predictable Paths: Redefining AI Security Incident Reporting for Agents
The paper discusses the need to adapt incident reporting frameworks for AI agents, which are rapidly deployed and face unique security challenges. By comparing AI systems and agents and consulting 23 experts, the authors identify key reporting elements such as agent memory, autonomy levels, and tool usage. They also highlight open research questions, potential reporting weaknesses like data leakage, and outline privacy requirements for secure AI agent deployment.
arXiv AI
Jun 18
SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.