World models give embodied AI a predictive core: they compress observations into states, simulate action-conditioned futures, and enable planning beyond reactive control. This predictive layer, however, opens a new security boundary-compromise can propagate from data, sensors, prompts, or feedback into physical action.
arXiv:2606. 16605v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: World models are widely used in robotic and agentic engineering control systems due to their ability to learn latent dynamics for planning and decision-making.
arXiv:2607. 15207v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: World-action models (WAMs) are emerging as a promising foundation for embodied control: rather than predicting actions alone, they learn representations that couple action generation with future world prediction.
arXiv:2606. 18697v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model-based learning agents use learned world models to predict future states, plan actions, and adapt to new environments.
arXiv:2606. 09499v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: World models have recently seen a rapid growth in both their popularity and capability as more data efficient tools for generating robot training data or simulating real world environments, with many works proposing their integration into the robot learning pipeline.
arXiv:2608. 05695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As large language model (LLM) agents increasingly invoke external tools and interact with real-world systems, unsafe actions may cause irreversible consequences on external states, user data, and downstream services.
arXiv:2605. 31119v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In robotics, dangers and adversity modes are often embodiment-specific and relative to each agent.
arXiv:2606. 01991v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly leverage the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to operate in complex environments, the expansion of their action spaces offers agents unsafe capabilities and underscores the risk of power-seeking.
arXiv:2511. 16088v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Traditional threat modeling remains reactive-focused on known TTPs and past incident data, while threat prediction and forecasting frameworks are often disconnected from operational or architectural artifacts.
arXiv:2607. 14006v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Penetration testing traditionally evaluates whether adversaries can exploit weaknesses in software, infrastructure, configurations, or operational controls to achieve security-relevant compromise.
arXiv:2606. 10371v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Diffusion-based action generation has become a foundational component of embodied AI, but its reliance on visual conditioning leaves deployed visuomotor policies vulnerable to adversarial manipulation.
arXiv:2607. 26820v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) evolve from standalone assistants into autonomous agents, ensuring their safety requires shifting beyond pointwise risk assessment to understand how risks emerge and unfold over long-horizon trajectories.
Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense.