arXiv:2606. 16605v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: World models are widely used in robotic and agentic engineering control systems due to their ability to learn latent dynamics for planning and decision-making.
By Junjian Zhang, Hao Tan, Ruonan Li, Dong Zhu, Aiping Li, Zhaoquan Gu
TrojanWorld is a backdoor framework that targets world-model agents by steering their internal imagination toward attacker-specified actions when a physical trigger is present. The attack uses Decision-Reflective Induction, Clean Behavior Anchoring, and Causal Propagation to maintain stealth, persistence, and high performance. Experiments on TD-MPC2, DreamerV3, and R2-Dreamer across several benchmarks show that the attack can induce target actions with minimal performance loss and can keep agents on a malicious trajectory even after the trigger is removed.
By Wenkai Huang, Siyuan Liang, Gaolei Li, Yiming Li, Tianhao Peng, Jianhua Li, Dacheng Tao
World models give embodied AI a predictive core: they compress observations into states, simulate action-conditioned futures, and enable planning beyond reactive control. This predictive layer, however, opens a new security boundary-compromise can propagate from data, sensors, prompts, or feedback into physical action.
arXiv:2606. 10371v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Diffusion-based action generation has become a foundational component of embodied AI, but its reliance on visual conditioning leaves deployed visuomotor policies vulnerable to adversarial manipulation.
By Zi Yin, Peilin Chai, Siyuan Huang, Zhanhao Hu
arXiv:2605.23220v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Despite the growing use of world models as decision-making agents, their adversarial robustness remains underexplored due to the lack of dedicated...
By Zhixiang Guo, Siyuan Liang, Shi Fu, Cheng Guo, Andras Balogh, Mark Jelasity, Dacheng Tao
arXiv:2608. 03231v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-Language-Action (VLA) policies promise general robotic manipulation, but their robustness against physical-world attacks remains fragile.
By Jinquan Zhang, Dongfu Yin, Run Yang, Yufeng Yan, Zhen Tian, F. Richard Yu
arXiv:2606. 18697v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model-based learning agents use learned world models to predict future states, plan actions, and adapt to new environments.
By Yibin Hu, Xiaolin Sun, Zizhan Zheng
arXiv:2608. 13453v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have emerged as generalist robotic policies capable of following diverse language instructions and performing a wide range of manipulation tasks.
By Yukun Dai, Mingzhe Dai, Tianshi Wang, Fengling Li, Jingjing Li, Lei Zhu
arXiv:2606. 15441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution.
By Lipeng He, Yihan Wang, Jiawen Zhang, N. Asokan
arXiv:2609.39178v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Recently, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have revolutionized robotic manipulation by seamlessly integrating visual perception, language understa...
By Songhua Yang, Ziyu Liu, Yuanwei Liu, Xuetao Li, Xuanye Fei, He Huang, Zheng Wang, Miao Li
The paper introduces the SAST-IR framework to evaluate large language models’ robustness against persuasion attacks in a memory‑less setting, revealing a flaw called "Refusal Inertia" that masks true vulnerability. Using the CP‑Agent and a custom CounterFact‑Strict dataset, the authors demonstrate that simple, diverse attack strategies achieve a 96% success rate, while complex attacks often trigger defensive compliance. The study highlights severe brittleness in current state‑of‑the‑art models when deprived of conversation history.
By Zhuoang Cai
Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense.