Breaking Planner Integrity Boundary: Enviroment State-Text Injection Attack on LLM-Driven Embodied Agents

The paper introduces the Environment State-Text Injection (ESTI) attack, a novel method that manipulates the textual representation of environment states in large language model‑driven embodied agents without altering user instructions, model parameters, or executors. ESTI re‑frames adversarial goals as false state evidence that aligns with the current environment, thereby influencing both planning and execution through object properties, spatial relations, affordances, task‑stage rules, and execution feedback. The authors also present ESTI‑Bench, a benchmark that evaluates attack propagation across the planning‑to‑execution closed loop, and demonstrate that ESTI outperforms existing baselines on multiple embodied task datasets, achieving up to 89.32% higher planning‑level and 43.69% higher execution‑level attack success rates.

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• llms
• agents
• robotics
• safety