arXiv AI

Breaking Planner Integrity Boundary: Enviroment State-Text Injection Attack on LLM-Driven Embodied Agents

The paper introduces the Environment State-Text Injection (ESTI) attack, a novel method that manipulates the textual representation of environment states in large language model‑driven embodied agents without altering user instructions, model parameters, or executors. ESTI re‑frames adversarial goals as false state evidence that aligns with the current environment, thereby influencing both planning and execution through object properties, spatial relations, affordances, task‑stage rules, and execution feedback. The authors also present ESTI‑Bench, a benchmark that evaluates attack propagation across the planning‑to‑execution closed loop, and demonstrate that ESTI outperforms existing baselines on multiple embodied task datasets, achieving up to 89.32% higher planning‑level and 43.69% higher execution‑level attack success rates.

arXiv AI
Aug 18

When State Becomes an Attack Surface: State-Semantic Injection in LLM-Driven Embodied Agents

arXiv:2608. 16806v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated capabilities in in-context learning, task decomposition, step-by-step reasoning, and code generation, driving their gradual evolution from text generation models into the core of agents capable of perceiving environments, invoking tools, and executing tasks.

By Jiawei Liu, Jiacheng Guo, Tian Zhang, Yiwei Xu, Juan Wang, Jinlin Fan, Bowen Xiao, Chi Guo, Keyan Guo, Hongxin Hu
arXiv AI
Aug 7

Hijacking Robots with a Piece of Paper: A Systematic Study of Physical Prompt Injection in VLM-Controlled Robots

arXiv:2608. 05715v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as planners in robotic systems, where they translate natural-language commands into executable actions grounded in visual scene understanding.

By S. M . Bhagya P. Samarakoon, M. A. Viraj J. Muthugala, W. K. R. Sachinthana, Mohan Rajesh Elara
arXiv AI
Sep 10

AgentLeak: Cloning Stronger LLM Agent Capabilities onto Weaker Agents Beyond Skill Stealing

The paper introduces AgentLeak, a black‑box attack that clones the task‑solving capabilities of a strong LLM agent onto a weaker one by exploiting differences between successful and failed executions. Unlike prior skill‑stealing methods that only recover explicit skill artifacts, AgentLeak identifies and incorporates missing procedural behaviors, boosting task pass rates by over 40% and closing more than 80% of the capability gap across 20 scenarios. The study demonstrates that observable execution behavior can leak proprietary procedural knowledge, posing a confidentiality risk for LLM agents.

By Xiaoting Lyu, Yuhong Wu, Yufei Han, Shichang Liu, Liang Zhang, Bin Wang, Bin Wang, Xiaobo Ma, Wei Wang
arXiv AI
Aug 26

What Guides the Agent? Adjudicating Unauthorized Behavior via Localizing Behavior-Guiding Instructions

The paper introduces Attnlocate, a runtime framework that localizes behavior‑guiding instructions within the attention matrix of large language model agents. By treating this localization as an object detection task, Attnlocate uses a multi‑head, multi‑layer attention aggregation scheme and a 1‑D U‑Net to identify spans that influence tool‑calling decisions. The system then adjudicates potential malicious invocations based on the authority of the source, achieving high detection metrics across diverse LLM families and demonstrating transferability to unseen models.

By Yichao Gao, Yumo Zhang, Yunhao Yao, Haohua Du, Puhan Luo, Ruiqi Li, Zhiqiang Wang
arXiv Machine Learning
2d ago

CoER: Defending against Adaptive Indirect Prompt Injection via Adversarial Co-Evolution and Refinement

The paper introduces CoER, a framework that defends language‑model agents against adaptive indirect prompt injection (IPI) by employing attacker‑defender co‑evolution and refinement. CoER models IPI as a general‑sum Markov game, uses Co‑PPO to maintain historical opponent populations, and fine‑tunes defenders only on verified safe demonstrations. In experiments across seven domains, CoER cuts attack success from 38.5% to 0.2% while boosting task utility from 63.2% to 76.3%.

By Boyang Zhang, Qingxin Xiao, Lingwei Dang, Qingyao Wu