Emergence of cooperation: A reputation-modulated reinforcement learning
arXiv:2608. 20016v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Reputation is widely recognized as a key mechanism for sustaining cooperation.
The study investigates how spatial patterns arise when agents in public goods dilemmas learn movement strategies via tabular Q‑learning. Cooperators tend to cluster around resource peaks, while co‑adaptation with defectors can alter cluster strength and motion, sometimes producing traveling bands. Higher cooperator learning rates combined with lower defector rates lead to the greatest welfare losses, and crowding penalties can mitigate these losses, linking learning rates to spatial organization and collective welfare.
arXiv:2608. 20016v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Reputation is widely recognized as a key mechanism for sustaining cooperation.
arXiv:2608.28046v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Collective behaviour in living systems is usually modelled as the outcome of a \emph{direct} social drive: agents are rewarded, or hard-wired, to ali...
The paper proposes a scalable traffic modeling approach that uses a single representative large language model (LLM) agent for each homogeneous traveler group, rather than one LLM per traveler. The representative agent maintains a mixed strategy over routes, updates it daily based on positive reinforcement signals, and uses a tunable step size to adjust its strategy. This design improves scalability, stabilizes learning, and produces interpretable dynamics that reproduce realistic behavioral patterns such as the decoy effect and income‑based willingness‑to‑pay differences.
The paper demonstrates that a minimal foraging swarm can approach the explore/exploit optimum of reinforcement learning without any learner or reward signal. Agents use heavy‑tailed Levy flights to explore, recruit neighbors via a threshold cascade on their proximity network, and disperse as patch crowds, creating a cycle that balances exploration and exploitation. The swarm attains the shape of the ideal‑free distribution (committed foragers track richness with slope 0.94) and reaches this allocation dynamically in about 150 steps, though it remains slightly exploitable and does not achieve the exact equilibrium.
arXiv:2610.07491v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When multiple agents share a cost budget, a common Lagrange multiplier can enforce the aggregate constraint but does not determine how its penalty sh...
arXiv:2609.07689v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In electric delivery fleets, mid-shift charging is non-trivial: each vehicle must decide when, where and how much to charge to finish on time with batt...
The paper investigates whether evolutionary stability guarantees that learning agents can achieve cooperative outcomes in a multi‑agent setting. Using a three‑agent governance game, the authors compare the evolutionary basin of attraction with learning basins derived from independent Q‑learning, scaled Boltzmann exploration, and SA–EA BQL. They find that while the evolutionary basin covers the entire sampled grid, only ε‑greedy Q‑learning attains a substantial learning basin, whereas the other methods fail to sustain cooperation, highlighting a disconnect between population‑level stability and finite‑sample learning accessibility.
arXiv:2607. 14574v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Collective problem solving often requires that group members consider the tradeoff between exploitation of known solutions and exploration for new ones, where information of known solutions can be disseminated among individual members through communication networks.
The paper introduces CURB, a reward‑shaping framework that penalizes the total variation distance between an agent’s action distributions under cooperation and defection histories, thereby preventing collusive equilibria in repeated games. By linking empirical Q‑learning collusion to Simple Penal Codes, the authors prove that any non‑trivial SPC can be neutralized, and demonstrate CURB’s effectiveness in both tabular and deep Q‑learning settings for Bertrand and Cournot competition.
The paper introduces self‑referenced social preferences, allowing agents to learn cooperative behavior without observing others’ private rewards. Each agent models its own reward, applies this model to observed transitions of other agents, and uses the resulting assessments to inform either the learning reward or policy updates. Experiments on three social‑dilemma environments show that agents can achieve cooperation and more equitable outcomes even when independent learners fail, with the best integration point depending on the type of social preference used.
Cooperation emergence is a central problem in multi-agent systems because decentralized agents must coordinate while adapting to the changing behavior of others. Evolutionary game theory identifies st...
The paper proposes a multi‑agent reinforcement learning framework that dynamically allocates incentives to drivers, encouraging them to take alternative routes. By doing so, it reduces total travel time by up to 16% and CO₂ emissions by 9% under an unlimited budget, while revealing a trade‑off between the two objectives. The study demonstrates that a carefully weighted multi‑objective function can improve both travel time and emissions beyond baseline levels.