The paper introduces aspiration-based perturbed learning automata (APLA), a payoff‑based learning scheme that incorporates an aspiration factor to reinforce action selection in distributed multi‑player games. It presents a stochastic stability analysis of APLA in positive‑utility games with noisy observations, establishing that the infinite‑dimensional Markov chain induced by the dynamics can be reduced to a finite‑dimensional one. This work extends previous results beyond potential and coordination games to generic non‑zero‑sum games, with a second part focusing on weakly acyclic games.
arXiv:2409. 01447v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We present a finite-sample analysis of decentralized learning in two-player zero-sum matrix games and stochastic games, with a focus on best-response-based learning algorithms.
The paper investigates learning Nash equilibria in partially observable Markov games (POMGs) where agents cannot fully observe the state. By focusing on a subclass with independent state transitions and a Markov potential game structure, the authors propose an independent learning algorithm that allows agents to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium using only their own observations and actions, without communication. Under a filter stability assumption, finite‑history policies are shown to approximate the POMG sufficiently, enabling a surrogate near‑potential Markov game and yielding quasi‑polynomial sample and computational complexity.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2610. 01181v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We consider stochastic games with independent controlled chains and unknown transition kernels, where players observe only their local states and realized payoffs.
The paper introduces a method for rational synthesis in stochastic multi‑agent systems with unknown dynamics, where each agent has a probabilistic temporal objective expressed in Probabilistic Linear Temporal Logic on Finite Traces. It formulates per‑agent rational synthesis as finding a strategy profile that satisfies the designated agent’s objective while also constituting a stable solution under chosen equilibrium concepts such as Nash or subgame‑perfect equilibrium. The authors provide conditional convergence guarantees for tabular Nash‑Q learning, certify satisfaction with finite‑sample confidence bounds, and evaluate strategic stability via approximate best‑response checking, validating the approach on eight general‑sum concurrent stochastic games.
The paper investigates online learning for multiple strategic agents interacting within a shared linear dynamical system that experiences adversarial disturbances. Each agent aims to minimize its own convex loss while observing the full state, and the study extends the stabilizing-baseline approach from nonstochastic online control to this multi‑agent setting. By employing online gradient descent with memory under state‑only and aggregate‑input feedback, the authors establish sublinear, near‑optimal per‑agent regret bounds and, in the common‑interest case, demonstrate equilibrium‑tracking guarantees via a time‑varying potential game framework.
arXiv:2609. 14959v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $\alpha$-potential games.
NashDreamer is a new model-based reinforcement learning framework designed for two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games. It introduces a centralized Multi-Agent Recurrent State-Space Model that separates environment dynamics from player strategy effects, enabling the use of any policy gradient algorithm while preserving convergence guarantees to Nash equilibria. Experiments on four benchmark games show that NashDreamer achieves significantly better sample efficiency than model-free baselines early in training, and the authors analyze its optimization landscape, noting a potential vulnerability to posterior collapse in stochastic settings.
arXiv:2607. 14877v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reachability is the most fundamental logical objective, yet it is notoriously difficult to learn in reinforcement learning settings: even for Markov decision processes, PAC learning of reachability is impossible without additional assumptions.
The paper investigates how to infer agents’ underlying incentives in strategic multi‑agent settings, where traditional inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) may fail to produce rewards that guide optimal play. It introduces the concept of strategic identifiability and shows that learning from a fixed pair of policies can be insufficient regardless of sample size. To address this, the authors propose an active IRL algorithm for two‑player repeated Stackelberg games, combining maximum‑likelihood estimation with experimental design to achieve finite‑sample guarantees on sub‑optimality, and validate the approach in an anti‑poaching scenario.
arXiv:2609.06467v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In performative reinforcement learning the deployed policy shapes the environment that generates the learner's future data, and the natural solution co...
arXiv:2608. 08268v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As firms increasingly deploy machine learning for strategic decision-making, understanding algorithmic interactions has become central to operations research and economics.