The paper investigates learning Nash equilibria in partially observable Markov games (POMGs) where agents cannot fully observe the state. By focusing on a subclass with independent state transitions and a Markov potential game structure, the authors propose an independent learning algorithm that allows agents to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium using only their own observations and actions, without communication. Under a filter stability assumption, finite‑history policies are shown to approximate the POMG sufficiently, enabling a surrogate near‑potential Markov game and yielding quasi‑polynomial sample and computational complexity.
arXiv:2609.00504v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In this work, we study radically uncoupled learning in discounted general-sum Markov games. Assuming ``$\mathsf{ETH}$ for $\mathsf{PPAD}$", we show t...
The paper introduces aspiration-based perturbed learning automata (APLA), a payoff‑based learning scheme that incorporates an aspiration factor to reinforce action selection in distributed multi‑player games. It presents a stochastic stability analysis of APLA in positive‑utility games with noisy observations, establishing that the infinite‑dimensional Markov chain induced by the dynamics can be reduced to a finite‑dimensional one. This work extends previous results beyond potential and coordination games to generic non‑zero‑sum games, with a second part focusing on weakly acyclic games.
arXiv:2604.01024v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study model-based learning of finite-window policies in tabular partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). A common approach to le...
arXiv:2409. 01447v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We present a finite-sample analysis of decentralized learning in two-player zero-sum matrix games and stochastic games, with a focus on best-response-based learning algorithms.
NashDreamer is a new model-based reinforcement learning framework designed for two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games. It introduces a centralized Multi-Agent Recurrent State-Space Model that separates environment dynamics from player strategy effects, enabling the use of any policy gradient algorithm while preserving convergence guarantees to Nash equilibria. Experiments on four benchmark games show that NashDreamer achieves significantly better sample efficiency than model-free baselines early in training, and the authors analyze its optimization landscape, noting a potential vulnerability to posterior collapse in stochastic settings.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2606. 00367v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Reinforcement learning problems typically define the goal as maximizing the expected value of a scalar reward function.
The paper introduces Fed‑LSVI, a federated online reinforcement learning algorithm that uses linear function approximation in episodic Markov decision processes. It achieves a regret bound of ≥O(√{Md^3H^4T}) while only exchanging compressed sufficient statistics, thereby meeting privacy constraints. The method reduces communication cost to logarithmic in the number of episodes, a marked improvement over previous approaches that required linear communication.
arXiv:2606. 16729v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: While there is an extensive body of work characterizing the sample complexity of discounted cumulative-reward MDPs, finite sample analyses for average-reward MDPs have been limited, and most existing works rely on restrictive assumptions such as ergodicity or access to a generative model.
arXiv:2607. 17823v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement Learning is a cornerstone technique for modern large reasoning models.
arXiv:2602. 12963v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: An important question in the field of AI is the extent to which successful behaviour requires an internal representation of the world.
We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage.