Local and Global Stability in Performative Reinforcement Learning
Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Machine Learning.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Machine Learning.
arXiv:2607. 11752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria.
For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.
arXiv:2607. 18554v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We develop the Continuous Distributed Coupled Policy Gradient (CDCPG) algorithm for cooperative reinforcement learning in networked Markov decision processes with continuous state and action spaces.
arXiv:2607. 08925v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Training reinforcement-learning agents directly on physical robots makes every fall costly, since a fall can damage the platform and cannot be undone like a simulator reset; the goal is therefore to minimize falls during training rather than trade them off against return, as constrained Markov decision process (MDP) formulations do.
The paper presents the first PAC learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games with uncertain transitions, addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium existence. It introduces data‑driven L¹ confidence sets over transition kernels and a robust CSG solver that computes a social‑welfare optimal ε‑NE, or provides a certificate that no exact NE exists. The algorithm achieves polynomial sample complexity under a minimum reachability condition and is validated on benchmark CSGs with near‑optimal performance.
arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).