arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 14

Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy

arXiv:2607. 11752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria.

By Georgios Piliouras, Ian Gemp, Siqi Liu, Luke Marris
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 13

Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy

For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.

arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 22

Scalable Policy Optimization for Networked Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning with Continuous State-Action Spaces

arXiv:2607. 18554v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We develop the Continuous Distributed Coupled Policy Gradient (CDCPG) algorithm for cooperative reinforcement learning in networked Markov decision processes with continuous state and action spaces.

By Dongming Wang, Pengcheng Dai, Wenwu Yu, Wei Ren
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 13

SafeExplorer: An Unbiased Policy Gradient for Reinforcement Learning with Recovery Interventions

arXiv:2607. 08925v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Training reinforcement-learning agents directly on physical robots makes every fall costly, since a fall can damage the platform and cannot be undone like a simulator reset; the goal is therefore to minimize falls during training rather than trade them off against return, as constrained Markov decision process (MDP) formulations do.

By Elham Daneshmand, Majid Khadiv, Glen Berseth, Hsiu-Chin Lin
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 4

Robust PAC Learning of Concurrent Stochastic Games

The paper presents the first PAC learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games with uncertain transitions, addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium existence. It introduces data‑driven L¹ confidence sets over transition kernels and a robust CSG solver that computes a social‑welfare optimal ε‑NE, or provides a certificate that no exact NE exists. The algorithm achieves polynomial sample complexity under a minimum reachability condition and is validated on benchmark CSGs with near‑optimal performance.

By Angel Y. He, David Parker
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 17

What preferences can - and cannot - predict in multi-agent online learning

arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).

By Omar Abbadi, Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos