arXiv:2510. 18183v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games remains a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning.
By Eason Yu, Tzu Hao Liu, Cl\'ement L. Canonne, Yunke Wang, Chang Xu, Nguyen H. Tran, Stefano V. Albrecht
arXiv:2603.06977v3 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is increasingly used to design learning-enabled agents that interact in shared environments. However, tra...
By Addison Kalanther, Sanika Bharvirkar, Shankar Sastry, Chinmay Maheshwari
The paper investigates learning Nash equilibria in partially observable Markov games (POMGs) where agents cannot fully observe the state. By focusing on a subclass with independent state transitions and a Markov potential game structure, the authors propose an independent learning algorithm that allows agents to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium using only their own observations and actions, without communication. Under a filter stability assumption, finite‑history policies are shown to approximate the POMG sufficiently, enabling a surrogate near‑potential Markov game and yielding quasi‑polynomial sample and computational complexity.
By Philip Jordan, Maryam Kamgarpour
arXiv:2409. 01447v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We present a finite-sample analysis of decentralized learning in two-player zero-sum matrix games and stochastic games, with a focus on best-response-based learning algorithms.
By Zaiwei Chen, Kaiqing Zhang, Eric Mazumdar, Asuman Ozdaglar, Adam Wierman
arXiv:2605. 29032v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) agents typically learn world models by minimizing predictive loss.
By Christoph Dann, Yishay Mansour, Mehryar Mohri
arXiv:2605. 28863v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Imperfect-information multiplayer games test whether agents can act under hidden information, sparse rewards, and non-stationary opponents.
By Aalok Patwa