The paper investigates how to infer agents’ underlying incentives in strategic multi‑agent settings, where traditional inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) may fail to produce rewards that guide optimal play. It introduces the concept of strategic identifiability and shows that learning from a fixed pair of policies can be insufficient regardless of sample size. To address this, the authors propose an active IRL algorithm for two‑player repeated Stackelberg games, combining maximum‑likelihood estimation with experimental design to achieve finite‑sample guarantees on sub‑optimality, and validate the approach in an anti‑poaching scenario.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2607. 00155v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study runtime human oversight of an AI agent when private information runs in both directions: the human privately knows her reward function, while the AI privately knows the quality of the action it proposes.
arXiv:2606. 19883v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in the competitive setup with two-sided matching markets under a human centric decision making model.
arXiv:2605. 11020v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) is typically formulated as maximizing entropy subject to matching the distribution of expert trajectories.
arXiv:2606. 29980v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Zero-shot Transfer in Reinforcement Learning (RL) aims to train an agent that can generate optimal policies for any reward function, without additional learning at transfer time, while training only on reward-free trajectories.
arXiv:2605. 29032v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) agents typically learn world models by minimizing predictive loss.
arXiv:2509. 03456v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Off-policy evaluation (OPE) and off-policy learning (OPL) are foundational for decision-making in offline contextual bandits.
The paper investigates how feedback from automated testing, human red teaming, and incident response can enhance AI system defenses by enabling effective repairs. It establishes conditions under which a finite attack surface is defended with probability one, derives completion-time bounds, and extends the analysis to dynamic attack surfaces and generalized repairs. A defender-led Stackelberg game is formulated to determine the least-cost allocation of proactive discovery and reactive repair, revealing equilibrium regimes where the defender may invest in none, one, or both capabilities, and demonstrates through numerical experiments that faster repair can shorten compromise duration without lowering compromise probability.
arXiv:2603. 00374v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories.
arXiv:2504.09006v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual...
The paper introduces Dually Regularized AIL, a model‑free algorithm for adversarial imitation learning that jointly applies KL policy regularization and a quadratic reward penalty based on expert and learner occupancies. It proves fast convergence rates, achieving a ×O(1/K+1/N) bound on the regularized imitation gap in finite‑horizon MDPs with general function approximation, and establishes the first algorithm to attain ×O(1/ε) sample complexity in both expert demonstrations and online interactions for this regularized objective.
The paper investigates when intrinsic rewards effectively drive exploration in reinforcement learning. It introduces a formal criterion that evaluates policies based on the counterfactual information they acquire, comparing how well their histories can replace experience from alternative policies. Using a simple environment, the authors show that common intrinsic reward objectives—count-based, prediction-error, empowerment, and information-gain—can lead to Pareto-suboptimal exploration under this criterion, and they propose conditions and a new objective that better align with optimal exploration.