arXiv:2607. 11752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria.
By Georgios Piliouras, Ian Gemp, Siqi Liu, Luke Marris
For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.
arXiv:2607. 18554v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We develop the Continuous Distributed Coupled Policy Gradient (CDCPG) algorithm for cooperative reinforcement learning in networked Markov decision processes with continuous state and action spaces.
By Dongming Wang, Pengcheng Dai, Wenwu Yu, Wei Ren
arXiv:2607. 08925v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Training reinforcement-learning agents directly on physical robots makes every fall costly, since a fall can damage the platform and cannot be undone like a simulator reset; the goal is therefore to minimize falls during training rather than trade them off against return, as constrained Markov decision process (MDP) formulations do.
By Elham Daneshmand, Majid Khadiv, Glen Berseth, Hsiu-Chin Lin
The paper presents the first PAC learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games with uncertain transitions, addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium existence. It introduces data‑driven L¹ confidence sets over transition kernels and a robust CSG solver that computes a social‑welfare optimal ε‑NE, or provides a certificate that no exact NE exists. The algorithm achieves polynomial sample complexity under a minimum reachability condition and is validated on benchmark CSGs with near‑optimal performance.
By Angel Y. He, David Parker
arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).
By Omar Abbadi, Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos
arXiv:2607. 22982v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Natural Policy Gradient (NPG) is a well-established Reinforcement Learning algorithm that underlies widely used methods such as Trust Region Policy Optimization and Proximal Policy Optimization, both of which have demonstrated strong empirical success.
By Asha Barua, Sajad Khodadadian
arXiv:2609. 14959v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $\alpha$-potential games.
By S. Rasoul Etesami
arXiv:2606. 11431v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Mirror Descent (MD) extends Gradient Descent (GD) beyond Euclidean geometry and has recently reappeared as a lens for KL-regularized policy optimization in reinforcement learning and LLM post-training.
By Shira Vansover-Hager, Matan Schliserman, Ofir Schlisselberg, Tomer Koren
The paper introduces aspiration-based perturbed learning automata (APLA), a payoff‑based learning scheme that incorporates an aspiration factor to reinforce action selection in distributed multi‑player games. It presents a stochastic stability analysis of APLA in positive‑utility games with noisy observations, establishing that the infinite‑dimensional Markov chain induced by the dynamics can be reduced to a finite‑dimensional one. This work extends previous results beyond potential and coordination games to generic non‑zero‑sum games, with a second part focusing on weakly acyclic games.
By Georgios C. Chasparis
arXiv:2602. 09474v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study reinforcement learning in MDPs whose transition function is stochastic at most steps but may behave adversarially at a fixed subset of $\Lambda$ steps per episode.
By Ofir Schlisselberg, Tal Lancewicki, Yishay Mansour
We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage.