arXiv:2610. 01181v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We consider stochastic games with independent controlled chains and unknown transition kernels, where players observe only their local states and realized payoffs.
arXiv:2607. 11752v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria.
The paper introduces Anchored Neighborhood Optimization (ANO), a new policy‑optimization method that directly designs a smooth, bounded gain field for the probability‑ratio surrogate objective. ANO anchors the identity map at a ratio of one, peaks at a specified trust‑region boundary, and limits the influence of extreme off‑policy samples while providing a bounded, redescending pull on outliers. Empirical results show ANO consistently outperforms existing methods on Atari and MuJoCo benchmarks, and it remains robust under aggressive learning‑rate settings.
The paper introduces Fast Regularized Policy Mirror Descent (PMD) that pairs policy updates with a single temporal-difference (TD) critic step. It proves global linear convergence for finite discounted MDPs using exact coordinate-wise Bellman updates and any positive actor stepsize, regardless of critic initialization. For stochastic TD-PMD with strongly convex mirror maps, the authors achieve an expected value gap of ε after “~O(1/((1-γ)^5 σ_b ε))” transitions, without requiring trajectory resets, generative models, or nested policy evaluation loops.
For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds.
arXiv:2607. 18554v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We develop the Continuous Distributed Coupled Policy Gradient (CDCPG) algorithm for cooperative reinforcement learning in networked Markov decision processes with continuous state and action spaces.
arXiv:2607. 08925v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Training reinforcement-learning agents directly on physical robots makes every fall costly, since a fall can damage the platform and cannot be undone like a simulator reset; the goal is therefore to minimize falls during training rather than trade them off against return, as constrained Markov decision process (MDP) formulations do.
arXiv:2302.07477v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study the optimal sample complexity of tabular reinforcement learning for infinite-horizon discounted Markov decision processes. The unrestricte...
The paper presents the first PAC learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games with uncertain transitions, addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium existence. It introduces data‑driven L¹ confidence sets over transition kernels and a robust CSG solver that computes a social‑welfare optimal ε‑NE, or provides a certificate that no exact NE exists. The algorithm achieves polynomial sample complexity under a minimum reachability condition and is validated on benchmark CSGs with near‑optimal performance.
arXiv:2608. 13810v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We examine the interplay between ordinal, preference-based solution concepts in games and the long-run behavior of game dynamics, asking in particular to what extent the combinatorial data of a game -- its preference graph -- determine the outcomes of no-regret learning dynamics -- such as follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL).
The paper investigates online learning for multiple strategic agents interacting within a shared linear dynamical system that experiences adversarial disturbances. Each agent aims to minimize its own convex loss while observing the full state, and the study extends the stabilizing-baseline approach from nonstochastic online control to this multi‑agent setting. By employing online gradient descent with memory under state‑only and aggregate‑input feedback, the authors establish sublinear, near‑optimal per‑agent regret bounds and, in the common‑interest case, demonstrate equilibrium‑tracking guarantees via a time‑varying potential game framework.
arXiv:2609. 38880v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the last iterate of standard importance-weighted temporal-difference (TD) learning from a single trajectory of a finite Markov decision process.