The paper presents the first PAC learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games with uncertain transitions, addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium existence. It introduces data‑driven L¹ confidence sets over transition kernels and a robust CSG solver that computes a social‑welfare optimal ε‑NE, or provides a certificate that no exact NE exists. The algorithm achieves polynomial sample complexity under a minimum reachability condition and is validated on benchmark CSGs with near‑optimal performance.
By Angel Y. He, David Parker
arXiv:2610. 01181v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We consider stochastic games with independent controlled chains and unknown transition kernels, where players observe only their local states and realized payoffs.
By S. Rasoul Etesami
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
By Panayotis Mertikopoulos
We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage.
arXiv:2409. 01447v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We present a finite-sample analysis of decentralized learning in two-player zero-sum matrix games and stochastic games, with a focus on best-response-based learning algorithms.
By Zaiwei Chen, Kaiqing Zhang, Eric Mazumdar, Asuman Ozdaglar, Adam Wierman
arXiv:2609.22757v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: A (coarse) correlated equilibrium (CE) is information-value-free (IVF) if a player can match the payoff obtained from recommendations by committing t...
By Ioannis Anagnostides, Weiqiang Zheng
The paper investigates learning Nash equilibria in partially observable Markov games (POMGs) where agents cannot fully observe the state. By focusing on a subclass with independent state transitions and a Markov potential game structure, the authors propose an independent learning algorithm that allows agents to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium using only their own observations and actions, without communication. Under a filter stability assumption, finite‑history policies are shown to approximate the POMG sufficiently, enabling a surrogate near‑potential Markov game and yielding quasi‑polynomial sample and computational complexity.
By Philip Jordan, Maryam Kamgarpour
arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.
By Nivasini Ananthakrishnan, Mark Bedaywi, Michael I. Jordan, Stuart Russell, Nika Haghtalab
The paper introduces aspiration-based perturbed learning automata (APLA), a payoff‑based learning scheme that incorporates an aspiration factor to reinforce action selection in distributed multi‑player games. It presents a stochastic stability analysis of APLA in positive‑utility games with noisy observations, establishing that the infinite‑dimensional Markov chain induced by the dynamics can be reduced to a finite‑dimensional one. This work extends previous results beyond potential and coordination games to generic non‑zero‑sum games, with a second part focusing on weakly acyclic games.
By Georgios C. Chasparis
arXiv:2605. 09200v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study adversarial noisy bandits given a known function class $\mathcal{F}$.
By Steve Hanneke, Kun Wang
arXiv:2609. 14959v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $\alpha$-potential games.
By S. Rasoul Etesami
arXiv:2608. 12753v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized multi-player reinforcement learning in episodic tabular Markov decision processes (MDPs) under three forms of information asymmetry: (A) unobserved actions with common rewards, (B) observed actions with independent rewards, and (C) unobserved actions with independent rewards.
By Larissa Xu, King Bi, William Chang