arXiv Machine Learning

Cycle-Space Informed Detection of Autoencoded Blind False Data Injection Attacks on Power Systems

arXiv:2605. 28912v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The rapid growth of AI-driven data centers and large-scale energy storage systems is increasing the reliance of power system operation on real-time measurement data and automated decision-making.

arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 11

From Cycle Space to Cycle Manifold: Limits and Achievability of Blind False Data Injection Attacks

The paper investigates blind false data injection attacks (FDIAs) on power grids, showing that for a connected DC branch‑flow model the residual‑sensitive subspace equals the weighted cycle space. This space is both necessary and sufficient for constructing complete stealthy attacks, revealing that only cycle‑space knowledge is required. The authors propose a benchmark, a measurement‑only reconstruction method, and extend the analysis to AC systems via a cycle manifold, demonstrating practical attack generation on GPUs.

By Xin Li, Chenhan Xiao, Jonathan Cohen, Aviad Elyashar, Yang Weng, Rami Puzis
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 9

Physically Consistent Null Space Alignment for Detection of Low-Magnitude False Data Injection Attacks

arXiv:2606. 08473v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: False data injection attacks (FDIAs) introducing small measurement perturbations can still cause large deviations in power system state estimation when the injected signals align with the pseudo-null space of the system model.

By Xin Li, Chenhan Xiao, Jonathan Cohen, Aviad Elyashar, Yang Weng, Rami Puzis
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 22

Glass-Box Deep Learning for FDIA Detection in Nonlinear Automatic Generation Control: A Kolmogorov-Arnold Network Approach

arXiv:2509.05259v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Automatic Generation Control (AGC) plays a critical role in maintaining power balance across multi-area power systems. However, its complete relian...

By Ahmad Mohammad Saber, Alok Paranjape, Jehad Jilan, Niranjana Naveen Nambiar, Amr Youssef, Deepa Kundur
arXiv AI
Jun 3

FlowGuard: Flow Matching for Identity-Independent Detection of Data-Free Model Stealing Attacks on Energy System Intrusion Detection Systems

arXiv:2606. 03430v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) deployed in energy infrastructure are vulnerable to model theft attacks, which allow adversaries to create evasive traffic offline.

By Maxime Schwarzer, Laurin Holz, Tobias Huerten, Johannes Loevenich, Thies Moehlenhof, Roberto Rigolin F. Lopes, Veit Hagenmeyer
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 14

Self-Verifying Anomaly Detection using Explainable AI for Cybersecurity of DER Networks

The paper introduces ExCYDER, an explainable AI framework for anomaly detection in Distributed Energy Resource (DER) networks. It combines LightGBM with SHAP to self-verify alerts, ensuring that each detection aligns with feature‑attribution evidence. Experiments on a realistic DNP3 dataset show over 98% detection accuracy, 44.6% rule‑SHAP consistency, 14.5 ms SHAP latency per alert, and minimal confidence deviation, while distinguishing coherent from inconsistent alerts without sacrificing accuracy.

By Damilola Popoola, Souradeep Bhattacharya, Manimaran Govindarasu
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 23

Learning Defensive Policies against Diverse Inference Attacks for Smart Meter Privacy

The paper introduces a black-box defense strategy for smart meter data that uses a proxy-guided hierarchical reinforcement learning framework to generate battery-based load-shaping policies. These policies inject realistic yet misleading appliance-level signatures into aggregate power signals, disrupting non-intrusive load monitoring attacks. Experiments on UK-DALE and REDD datasets show significant increases in appliance-level reconstruction error and reductions in attacker F1 scores across multiple unseen NILM models.

By Ruichang Zhang, Mustafa A. Mustafa
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 24

EvEMTBench: An Open Benchmark for Machine Learning in Power System Protection

EvEMTBench is an open, executable, and versioned benchmark designed to standardize the evaluation of machine‑learning methods for power system protection. It defines 12 protection and event‑analysis functions across four grids (20–345 kV) as 24 scored tasks, enabling structured assessment under varied observability, distribution shifts, and cross‑grid transfer scenarios. The benchmark includes committed data partitions, leakage controls, and reproducible reporting, and demonstrates that wider observability does not always help, that shifted conditions expose hidden failures, and that fault detection transfers better than fault localization.

By Julian Oelhaf, Georg Kordowich, Christian Bergler, Andreas Maier, Johann J\"ager, Siming Bayer