The paper investigates blind false data injection attacks (FDIAs) on power grids, showing that for a connected DC branch‑flow model the residual‑sensitive subspace equals the weighted cycle space. This space is both necessary and sufficient for constructing complete stealthy attacks, revealing that only cycle‑space knowledge is required. The authors propose a benchmark, a measurement‑only reconstruction method, and extend the analysis to AC systems via a cycle manifold, demonstrating practical attack generation on GPUs.
arXiv:2605. 28912v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The rapid growth of AI-driven data centers and large-scale energy storage systems is increasing the reliance of power system operation on real-time measurement data and automated decision-making.
arXiv:2606. 08473v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: False data injection attacks (FDIAs) introducing small measurement perturbations can still cause large deviations in power system state estimation when the injected signals align with the pseudo-null space of the system model.
arXiv:2606. 06347v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of attack detection in cyber-physical systems without any knowledge of the plant model or its structure.
arXiv:2607. 12241v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Machine-learned surrogates for the AC power flow (ACPF) problem amortize the cost of repeated solves on a fixed network, but lose one to two orders of magnitude of accuracy when a line outage changes the topology.
arXiv:2607. 20480v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Accurate distribution system topology is essential for outage localization, voltage analytics, and operation of distribution grids, yet maintaining reliable connectivity records remains challenging in practice due to heterogeneous and imperfect utility data.
arXiv:2606.
arXiv:2606. 18599v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is the primary communication standard for Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicles, but its lack of encryption and authentication exposes it to a range of security threats.
arXiv:2308. 07867v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The absence of formal performance guarantees in machine learning (ML) has limited its adoption for safety-critical power system applications, where confidence and interpretability are as vital as accuracy.
arXiv:2607. 13221v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-time N-1 contingency screening in an energy management system trades assurance against cost: verifying every credible outage with full power flow is too slow, while fast linear-sensitivity screening gives no statistical guarantee and can silently pass unsafe operating points, especially when a controller drives the system into unfamiliar regimes.
arXiv:2606. 09189v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: EEG foundation-model releases are usually audited one endpoint at a time: raw-reconstruction, membership inference, identity linkage, or DP-SGD on the downstream head.
arXiv:2607. 13801v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are increasingly studied for security monitoring, yet their robustness against feasible traffic manipulation remains largely empirical.
arXiv:2606. 03430v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) deployed in energy infrastructure are vulnerable to model theft attacks, which allow adversaries to create evasive traffic offline.