arXiv Machine Learning By Xin Li, Chenhan Xiao, Jonathan Cohen, Aviad Elyashar, Yang Weng, Rami Puzis

Physically Consistent Null Space Alignment for Detection of Low-Magnitude False Data Injection Attacks

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arXiv:2606. 08473v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: False data injection attacks (FDIAs) introducing small measurement perturbations can still cause large deviations in power system state estimation when the injected signals align with the pseudo-null space of the system model.

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arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 11

From Cycle Space to Cycle Manifold: Limits and Achievability of Blind False Data Injection Attacks

The paper investigates blind false data injection attacks (FDIAs) on power grids, showing that for a connected DC branch‑flow model the residual‑sensitive subspace equals the weighted cycle space. This space is both necessary and sufficient for constructing complete stealthy attacks, revealing that only cycle‑space knowledge is required. The authors propose a benchmark, a measurement‑only reconstruction method, and extend the analysis to AC systems via a cycle manifold, demonstrating practical attack generation on GPUs.

By Xin Li, Chenhan Xiao, Jonathan Cohen, Aviad Elyashar, Yang Weng, Rami Puzis