Empirical work on algorithmic collusion asks one question of the data: are prices supracompetitive? We show this can be answered "no" by a conspiracy that is nonetheless profitable.
arXiv:2606. 29457v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When two companies bid to buy the same target, no one knows exactly what the target is worth.
By Zain Naboulsi
arXiv:2607. 26385v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Empirical work on algorithmic collusion asks one question of the data: are prices supracompetitive?
By Xin Xu, Chengrui Wu, Jiayu Lu, Kaizhen Tan, Siru Tao, Hanzhe Hong
arXiv:2606. 05363v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: On a platform with many sellers, should a pricing algorithm explicitly model competitors' prices when learning demand?
By Yuhang Wu, Assaf Zeevi
arXiv:2608. 07538v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents move from decision support to autonomous procurement, firms need to know whether delegated negotiators create value, divide it predictably, and avoid money-losing contracts.
By Chen Liang, Fasheng Xu
arXiv:2608. 09586v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Independent Chip Model (ICM) converts tournament chips into reference prize equity, and policies are routinely constructed against those values.
By Boning Li, Longbo Huang
arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.
By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin
arXiv:2608. 14613v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern LLM-agent frameworks increasingly interoperate through standards such as Anthropic's Model Context Protocol (MCP) for agent-to-tool access and Google's Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol for agent delegation and negotiation.
By Wael Albayaydh, Rui Zhao
arXiv:2607. 18045v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Organizations often pool dispersed information into one ranking and then allow many agents to act on that shared view.
By Yohei Nakajima
Organizations often pool dispersed information into one ranking and then allow many agents to act on that shared view. In a discovery problem, this can improve beliefs while reducing coverage.
arXiv:2605. 13909v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation.
By Erica Zhang, Fangzhao Zhang, Aneesh Pappu, Batu El, Jose Blanchet, Susan Athey, Jiashuo Liu, James Zou
arXiv:2510. 15238v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Optimizing a single advertising campaign across heterogeneous channels is a central challenge in industrial autobidding.
By Qi Li, Wendong Huang, Qichen Ye, Wutong Xu, Cheems Wang, Wei Yuan, Miao Xu, Zhiyu Mou, Guan Wang, Rongquan Bai, Chuan Yu, Jian Xu