arXiv:2607. 02255v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Memory for a long-horizon LLM agent is a contract about what each future decision is allowed to see.
By Xiangchen Cheng, Yunwei Jiang, Jianwen Sun, Zizhen Li, Chuanhao Li, Xiangcheng Cao, Yihao Liu, Fanrui Zhang, Li Jin, Kaipeng Zhang
arXiv:2606. 29169v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many important games have more than two players and imperfect information.
By Sam Ganzfried
arXiv:2607. 10960v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Trader-facing dynamic fees are increasingly proposed for automated market makers (AMMs), but historical data do not identify how order flow would respond: trader-facing fees do not vary, trader types are latent, and a replayed tape is not a sequential decision environment.
By Wen-Ting Wang
arXiv:2608. 14761v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: At a finite public-chance cut, counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) must choose how many outcomes to evaluate before each regret update.
By Jiaxing Guo, Lei Ye
arXiv:2608. 06362v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deciding which of two agents is stronger means playing games until skill outweighs luck, and every game costs money, model inference, or expert time.
By Boning Li, Yu Chen, Longbo Huang
arXiv:2607. 26253v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is bottlenecked by rollout generation, yet many sampled prompts produce saturated groups (all responses correct or all incorrect) whose zero reward variance yields no policy-gradient signal.
By Pixel Nomand, Elena Voss, Marcus Hale, Sofia Reyes