A3M: Adaptive, Adversarial and Multi-Objective Learning for Strategic Bidding in Repeated Auctions
arXiv:2606. 28943v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Learning to bid in repeated multi-unit auctions with bandit feedback poses a fundamental challenge.
arXiv:2510. 14642v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV).
arXiv:2606. 28943v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Learning to bid in repeated multi-unit auctions with bandit feedback poses a fundamental challenge.
FastCombo is a deep reinforcement learning method for iterative combinatorial auctions that learns price policies offline and applies them online with a single neural‑network forward pass. By formulating the problem as a partially observable Markov decision process, it assigns credit to queries that enable future decisions, thereby reducing the expected number of auction rounds. Experiments show that FastCombo achieves competitive clearing while cutting online price‑selection time by roughly 300–900 times compared to a standard Bayesian baseline.
The paper introduces a scalable framework that uses decentralized markets of self‑interested agents to solve multi‑step tasks. It shows that when agents compete through sequential auctions, perfect competition fails because clones drive profits to zero, while no competition also collapses value extraction. By allowing heterogeneous agents to shade bids strategically, the authors demonstrate that imperfect competition can sustain profitable margins while still achieving high task success rates at low costs, evaluating four bidding algorithms across three auction protocols.
arXiv:2609.13825v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement learning trading systems published in the academic literature overwhelmingly rely on price-aggregate state representations (OHLCV bars) o...
arXiv:2607. 24779v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Online advertising bidding systems typically deploy multiple offline-trained expert models (e.
arXiv:2609.37321v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Power markets are a natural testbed for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), where multiple self-interested participants repeatedly submit bids...
arXiv:2606. 06480v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many real-world competitive systems require multiple decision-makers to act simultaneously under shared constraints, limited information, and repeated interaction, as in auctions, resource allocation, and security competition.
The paper presents a reinforcement learning framework for training autonomous large language model agents to act as sellers in multi-product bargaining markets. It models the problem as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process and introduces a structured message protocol to map natural language into a regulated decision space. Using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards, the trained agents match limited inventory to buyers more effectively, achieving seller surplus extraction and allocation quality comparable to or better than trillion‑parameter models, and generalize to unseen market conditions.
arXiv:2608. 00123v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-native advertising embeds sponsored content directly into model-generated responses, shifting the unit of sale from a fixed slot to a moment within an evolving conversation.
arXiv:2605. 09448v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study the operational problem of automated bidding in repeated first-price auctions under budget and return-on-spend (RoS) constraints.
arXiv:2601. 02754v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: With the rapid development of e-commerce, auto-bidding has become a key asset in optimizing advertising performance under diverse advertiser environments.
The paper introduces a framework for reinforcement learning in Markov decision processes where policies are ordered by the information they provide, allowing data from one policy to estimate the performance of others. An epoch‑based algorithm is developed for infinite‑horizon average‑cost MDPs with continuous state and action spaces, achieving regret that scales with the width of the policy class’s information order. The authors apply the framework to lost‑sales inventory, dual‑sourcing, and state‑dependent queueing systems, demonstrating improved regret bounds and empirical performance without requiring global convexity or specific arrival‑rate structures.