arXiv:2606. 29457v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When two companies bid to buy the same target, no one knows exactly what the target is worth.
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arXiv:2604.22230v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Performance manipulation arises when agents exploit easily measurable, routine tasks to inflate observable outcomes without contributing genu...
arXiv:2503. 01701v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Most microeconomic models of interest involve optimizing a piecewise linear function.
arXiv:2609.22757v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A (coarse) correlated equilibrium (CE) is information-value-free (IVF) if a player can match the payoff obtained from recommendations by committing t...
arXiv:2608. 08407v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A bidder can quietly buy a stake in a company before making an offer for it.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
Organizations often pool dispersed information into one ranking and then allow many agents to act on that shared view. In a discovery problem, this can improve beliefs while reducing coverage.