arXiv:2608. 07532v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern agentic AI systems combine multiple large language model agents with heterogeneous skills, yet most architectures either fix communication in advance or allow full broadcast.
arXiv:2606. 05363v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: On a platform with many sellers, should a pricing algorithm explicitly model competitors' prices when learning demand?
arXiv:2608. 08407v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A bidder can quietly buy a stake in a company before making an offer for it.
The paper introduces a scalable framework that uses decentralized markets of self‑interested agents to solve multi‑step tasks. It shows that when agents compete through sequential auctions, perfect competition fails because clones drive profits to zero, while no competition also collapses value extraction. By allowing heterogeneous agents to shade bids strategically, the authors demonstrate that imperfect competition can sustain profitable margins while still achieving high task success rates at low costs, evaluating four bidding algorithms across three auction protocols.
The paper investigates whether pricing algorithms on multi‑seller platforms should incorporate competitors’ prices when learning demand. It compares two strategies: informed sellers that use competitor prices in their learning models, and oblivious sellers that ignore them. The study finds that oblivious sellers must explore prices more aggressively to offset missing competitor information; when all sellers are oblivious, prices eventually converge to the competitive outcome, but insufficient exploration can create many pseudo‑equilibria. In mixed markets, informed sellers earn more, and the unique Nash equilibrium is a fully informed market where prices efficiently converge to the competitive outcome, showing that oblivious modeling does not reliably produce collusion.
arXiv:2503. 01701v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Most microeconomic models of interest involve optimizing a piecewise linear function.
arXiv:2609. 03846v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical additive valuations, focusing on envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Nash social welfare (NSW).
arXiv:2505.02796v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study budget pacing in repeated first-price auctions when an advertiser's private-value distributions change over time and the stationary...
arXiv:2605. 09448v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study the operational problem of automated bidding in repeated first-price auctions under budget and return-on-spend (RoS) constraints.
arXiv:2608. 07538v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents move from decision support to autonomous procurement, firms need to know whether delegated negotiators create value, divide it predictably, and avoid money-losing contracts.
arXiv:2606. 29457v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When two companies bid to buy the same target, no one knows exactly what the target is worth.
arXiv:2610.06892v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Learning from human preference data is the dominant route to aligning language models with human values. In linear social choice, where rewards are l...