arXiv Machine Learning
NePPO: Near-Potential Policy Optimization for General-Sum Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
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arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 2
NashDreamer: Model-Based Reinforcement Learning for Zero-Sum Imperfect-Information Games
NashDreamer is a new model-based reinforcement learning framework designed for two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games. It introduces a centralized Multi-Agent Recurrent State-Space Model that separates environment dynamics from player strategy effects, enabling the use of any policy gradient algorithm while preserving convergence guarantees to Nash equilibria. Experiments on four benchmark games show that NashDreamer achieves significantly better sample efficiency than model-free baselines early in training, and the authors analyze its optimization landscape, noting a potential vulnerability to posterior collapse in stochastic settings.
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 11
Phi-Actor-Critic: Steering General-Sum Games to Pareto-Efficient Correlated Equilibria
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 11
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning via Agent-Specific Preference
arXiv:2608. 08604v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is a powerful framework for solving complex collaborative tasks, but it relies heavily on well-defined global reward functions.
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 4
NashPG: A Policy Gradient Method with Iteratively Refined Regularization for Finding Nash Equilibria
arXiv:2510. 18183v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games remains a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning.
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 11
Regret, equilibrium, and learning in games: A guided tour
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 14
Independent Learning of Nash Equilibria in Partially Observable Markov Potential Games with Decoupled Dynamics
The paper investigates learning Nash equilibria in partially observable Markov games (POMGs) where agents cannot fully observe the state. By focusing on a subclass with independent state transitions and a Markov potential game structure, the authors propose an independent learning algorithm that allows agents to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium using only their own observations and actions, without communication. Under a filter stability assumption, finite‑history policies are shown to approximate the POMG sufficiently, enabling a surrogate near‑potential Markov game and yielding quasi‑polynomial sample and computational complexity.