Independent Reinforcement Learning in Discounted Markov Games
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arXiv:2610. 01181v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We consider stochastic games with independent controlled chains and unknown transition kernels, where players observe only their local states and realized payoffs.
The paper investigates learning Nash equilibria in partially observable Markov games (POMGs) where agents cannot fully observe the state. By focusing on a subclass with independent state transitions and a Markov potential game structure, the authors propose an independent learning algorithm that allows agents to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium using only their own observations and actions, without communication. Under a filter stability assumption, finite‑history policies are shown to approximate the POMG sufficiently, enabling a surrogate near‑potential Markov game and yielding quasi‑polynomial sample and computational complexity.
arXiv:2610.03621v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: There has been a surge of recent work on correlated equilibrium concepts in Markov games. However, existing results focus on concepts weaker than nor...
The paper presents an exponential lower bound on the number of iterations required by Howard's policy iteration algorithm for deterministic discounted Markov decision processes with at most two actions per state, when the discount factor is part of the input. This result shows that Howard's method cannot be strongly polynomial in this setting and establishes an exponential gap compared to the simplex method with Dantzig's pivoting rule, which remains strongly polynomial. Even with rewards limited to logarithmic bit length, a stretched‑exponential lower bound is achieved, highlighting a fundamental difference between decentralized, simultaneous improvements and Dantzig's coordinated single‑action selection.
arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.
The paper presents an algorithm that lets a learning agent ask for help from a mentor and transfer knowledge between similar states, enabling safe and effective learning in Markov decision processes with irreversible dynamics and infinite state spaces. It proves that both regret and the number of mentor queries grow sublinearly over time, using a sequence of three reductions to achieve a general result. The work claims to be the first formal proof that an agent can achieve high reward while becoming self‑sufficient in an unknown, unbounded, high‑stakes environment without resets.