arXiv Machine Learning
3d ago

Independent Learning of Nash Equilibria in Partially Observable Markov Potential Games with Decoupled Dynamics

The paper investigates learning Nash equilibria in partially observable Markov games (POMGs) where agents cannot fully observe the state. By focusing on a subclass with independent state transitions and a Markov potential game structure, the authors propose an independent learning algorithm that allows agents to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium using only their own observations and actions, without communication. Under a filter stability assumption, finite‑history policies are shown to approximate the POMG sufficiently, enabling a surrogate near‑potential Markov game and yielding quasi‑polynomial sample and computational complexity.

By Philip Jordan, Maryam Kamgarpour
arXiv AI
Jul 10

Provably Optimal Learning Algorithms for Assistance Games

arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.

By Nivasini Ananthakrishnan, Mark Bedaywi, Michael I. Jordan, Stuart Russell, Nika Haghtalab
arXiv AI
6d ago

Safe Learning Under Irreversible Dynamics via Asking for Help

The paper presents an algorithm that lets a learning agent ask for help from a mentor and transfer knowledge between similar states, enabling safe and effective learning in Markov decision processes with irreversible dynamics and infinite state spaces. It proves that both regret and the number of mentor queries grow sublinearly over time, using a sequence of three reductions to achieve a general result. The work claims to be the first formal proof that an agent can achieve high reward while becoming self‑sufficient in an unknown, unbounded, high‑stakes environment without resets.

By Benjamin Plaut, Juan Li\'evano-Karim, Hanlin Zhu, Stuart Russell
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Sep 3

Robust PAC Learning of Concurrent Stochastic Games

We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage.

arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 16

Learning Policy from a Single Trajectory in Average-Reward Markov Decision Process

arXiv:2606. 16729v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: While there is an extensive body of work characterizing the sample complexity of discounted cumulative-reward MDPs, finite sample analyses for average-reward MDPs have been limited, and most existing works rely on restrictive assumptions such as ergodicity or access to a generative model.

By Jongmin Lee, Ernest K. Ryu, Vaneet Aggarwal